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Monetary Policy and the Economic Outlook
Economic activity in the United States expanded at a
moderate pace, on average, in the second half of 2010
and early 2011. In the spring and early summer, a num-
ber of key indicators of economic activity softened
relative to the readings posted in late 2009 and the first
part of 2010, raising concerns about the durability of
the recovery. In light of these developments—and in
order to put the economic recovery on a firmer foot-
ing—the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
provided additional monetary policy stimulus during
the second half of 2010 by reinvesting principal repay-
ments from its holdings of agency debt and agency
mortgage-backed securities in longer-term Treasury
securities and by announcing its intention to purchase
an additional $600 billion of Treasury securities by the
end of the second quarter of 2011.
Financial market conditions improved notably in the
fall of 2010, partly in response to actual and expected
increases in monetary policy accommodation. In addi-
tion, later in the year, the tenor of incoming economic
news strengthened somewhat, and the downside risks
to economic growth appeared to recede. Nonetheless,
the job market has improved only slowly. Employment
gains have been modest, and although the unemploy-
ment rate fell noticeably in December and January, the
margin of slack in the labor market remains wide.
Meanwhile, despite rapid increases in commodity
prices, longer-term inflation expectations remained
stable, and measures of underlying consumer price
inflation continued to trend downward on net.
Real gross domestic product (GDP) rose at a moder-
ate rate in the third quarter. Inventories provided the
principal impetus to growth while final sales showed
little vigor—the same pattern that prevailed in the first
half of the year. Less favorable readings that began to
emerge during the second quarter for a range of indi-
cators—new claims for unemployment insurance,
industrial production, and numerous surveys of busi-
ness activity, among others—pointed to a slowing in
the pace of the recovery and suggested that the transi-
tion from a recovery boosted importantly by the inven-
tory cycle to one propelled mainly by private final
demand was proceeding only very gradually. Later in
the year, however, this process appeared to gain trac-
tion. Indeed, real GDP is estimated to have risen a
little faster in the fourth quarter than in the third quar-
ter despite a substantial slowdown in the pace of
inventory investment in the fourth quarter; final sales
increased much more rapidly in the fourth quarter
than earlier.
Over the second half of 2010, consumer spending
posted a solid gain, boosted in part by continued,
albeit modest, increases in real wage and salary
income; some waning of the drag on outlays from ear-
lier declines in household net worth; and a modest
improvement in the availability of consumer credit.
Businesses continued to step up their spending on
equipment and software in response to a brighter out-
look for sales as well as more favorable conditions in
credit markets. In the external sector, the continued
rebound in exports was supported by firming foreign
demand. Meanwhile, the construction sector remained
exceptionally weak.
The continued recovery in economic activity has
been accompanied by only a slow improvement in
labor market conditions. Private payroll employment
has moved up at a relatively tepid rate—about 115,000
per month, on average, since the February 2010 trough
in employment—recouping only a small portion of the
8¾ million jobs lost during 2008 and 2009. Over most
of this period, the pace of hiring was insufficient to
substantially reduce the unemployment rate. In
December and January, however, the jobless rate was
reported to have declined noticeably. In addition to the
recent drop in the unemployment rate, some other
indicators of labor market conditions—for example,
measures of firms’ hiring plans—have brightened a bit,
raising the prospect that a pickup in the pace of hiring
may be in the offing. That said, the level of the unem-
ployment rate remains very elevated, and the long-term
unemployed continue to account for a historically large
fraction of overall joblessness.
Consumer price inflation trended down during 2010
as slack in resource utilization restrained cost pressures
while longer-term inflation expectations remained
stable. Although the prices of crude oil and many
industrial and agricultural commodities rose rapidly in
the latter half of 2010 and the early part of 2011, over-
1all personal consumption expenditures (PCE) prices
increased at an annual rate of just 1¼ percent over the
12 months ending in January, which compares with a
2½ percent rise during the preceding 12 months. Core
PCE prices—which exclude prices for food and
energy—rose ¾ percent in the 12 months ending in
January.
Financial market conditions continued to be sup-
portive of economic growth in the second half of 2010
and into 2011. Equity prices rose solidly, reflecting the
more accommodative stance of monetary and fiscal
policy, an improved economic outlook, and better-
than-expected corporate earnings reports. Yields on
longer-term Treasury securities declined in the summer
and early autumn, reflecting in part anticipation of
additional monetary policy stimulus, but subsequently
rose as economic prospects improved and as market
expectations of the ultimate size of FOMC Treasury
purchases were revised down. Despite some volatility,
yields on Treasury securities remained relatively low on
balance. Medium- and longer-term inflation compen-
sation derived from inflation-indexed Treasury securi-
ties increased since the summer as concerns about
deflation eased, though these measures remained
within historical ranges. Interest rates on fixed-rate
residential mortgages moved broadly in line with yields
on Treasury securities while the spreads between yields
on corporate bonds and those on Treasury securities
declined; overall, both mortgage rates and corporate
yields continued to be at low levels. Although bank
lending policies generally stayed tight, banks reported
some easing in those conditions on net. After posting
substantial declines since the third quarter of
2008, total loans held on the books of banks showed
signs of stabilizing in recent months.
Larger nonfinancial corporations with access to
capital markets took advantage of favorable financial
conditions to issue debt at a robust pace. Bond and
syndicated loan issuance was strong, particularly
among lower-rated corporate borrowers. Commercial
and industrial loans on banks’ books started to expand
around the end of 2010. Nevertheless, small, bank-
dependent businesses remained constrained in their
access to credit, although some indicators suggested
that credit availability for these firms was beginning to
improve.
Household debt appears to have contracted in the
second half of 2010, but at a somewhat slower pace
than earlier in the year. Household mortgage debt
likely continued to decline, as housing demand
remained weak and lending standards were reportedly
still stringent. Revolving consumer credit also con-
tracted. By contrast, nonrevolving consumer credit—
primarily auto and student loans—increased solidly in
the final quarter of 2010.
After first emerging during the spring, concerns
about fiscal and banking developments in Europe
resurfaced later in the year. Although some European
sovereigns and financial institutions faced renewed
funding pressures in the fourth quarter, the repercus-
sions in broader global financial markets were muted.
To help minimize the risk that strains abroad could
spread to the United States, as well as to continue to
support liquidity conditions in global money markets,
the FOMC in December approved an extension of the
temporary U.S. dollar liquidity swap arrangements
with a number of foreign central banks.
Apparently seeking to boost returns in an environ-
ment of low interest rates, investors displayed an
increased appetite for higher-yielding fixed-income
instruments in the second half of 2010 and into 2011,
which likely supported strong issuance of these prod-
ucts and contributed to a narrowing of risk spreads,
such as those on corporate debt instruments. Informa-
tion from a variety of sources, including the Federal
Reserve Board’s Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey
on Dealer Financing Terms, suggests that use of
dealer-intermediated leverage by financial market par-
ticipants rose a bit in recent quarters but remained well
below its pre-crisis levels.
1 The condition of financial
institutions generally appeared to improve further, and
the regulatory capital ratios of commercial banks, par-
ticularly the largest banks, moved higher.
With the pace of recovery in output and employ-
ment seen as disappointingly slow and measures of
inflation viewed as somewhat low relative to levels
judged consistent with the Committee’s mandate, the
FOMC took several actions to provide additional sup-
port to the economic recovery during the second half
of last year. In August, the FOMC decided to reinvest
principal payments from agency debt and agency
mortgage-backed securities held in the System Open
Market Account (SOMA) in longer-term Treasury
securities to keep constant the size of the SOMA port-
folio and so avoid an implicit tightening of monetary
policy. In November, to provide further policy accom-
modation to help support the economic recovery, the
FOMC announced its intention to purchase an addi-
tional $600 billion in longer-term Treasury securities
by the end of the second quarter of 2011. Throughout
the second half of 2010 and early 2011, the FOMC
maintained a target range for the federal funds rate of
between 0 and ¼ percent and reiterated its expectation
1. The survey is conducted quarterly and is available at
www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/scoos.htm.
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resource utilization, subdued inflation trends, and
stable inflation expectations, were likely to warrant
exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate for
an extended period.
The Federal Reserve continued to develop and test
tools to drain or immobilize large volumes of banking
system reserves in order to ensure that it will be able to
smoothly and effectively exit from the current extraor-
dinarily accommodative policy stance at the appropri-
ate time. The Committee continues to monitor the eco-
nomic outlook and financial developments, and it will
employ its policy tools as necessary to support the eco-
nomic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over
time, returns to levels consistent with its mandate.
The economic projections prepared in conjunction
withtheJanuaryFOMCmeetingarepresentedinPart4
of this report. In broad terms, FOMC participants
anticipated a sustained but modest recovery in real
economic activity this year that would pick up some-
what in 2012 and 2013. The expansion was expected to
be led by gains in consumer and business spending that
are supported by improvements in household and busi-
ness confidence. Nevertheless, economic growth was
expected to be damped by a number of headwinds,
including the gradual pace of improvements in the
labor market, still-stringent borrowing conditions for
households and bank-dependent small businesses, lin-
gering household and business uncertainty, and ongo-
ing weakness in real estate markets. On balance,
FOMC participants anticipated that real GDP would
increase at above-trend rates over the next three years,
but not as rapidly as in previous recoveries. Meanwhile,
the unemployment rate was projected to fall gradually.
Inflation was expected to drift up slowly toward the
levels that Committee participants believe to be most
consistent with the Committee’s mandate. Reflecting
their assessment that the recovery appeared to be on a
firmer footing, the participants upgraded slightly their
projections for near-term economic growth relative to
the ones they prepared in conjunction with the Novem-
ber FOMC meeting; otherwise, their projections for
economic growth and inflation were little changed.
Participants generally judged that the uncertainty
attached to their projections for both economic activity
and inflation was greater than historical norms. A sub-
stantial majority of participants viewed the risks to
both economic growth and inflation as balanced; only
a few saw them as tilted either to the upside or to the
downside. In November, a noticeable share of partici-
pants had seen the risks—particularly those to eco-
nomic growth—as tilted to the downside. Participants
also reported their assessments of the rates to which
key macroeconomic variables would be expected to
converge over the longer term under appropriate mon-
etary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the
economy. The central tendencies of these longer-run
projections were 2.5 to 2.8 percent for real GDP
growth, 5.0 to 6.0 percent for the unemployment rate,
and 1.6 to 2.0 percent for the inflation rate.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 3Part 2
Recent Economic and Financial Developments
Economic activity expanded at a moderate pace, on
balance, in the second half of 2010. According to the
currently available estimates from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis, real gross domestic product (GDP)
increased at an annual rate of about 2¾ percent, on
average, over that period (figure 1). In the third quar-
ter, as had been the case in the first half of the year,
much of the increase was the result of inventory accu-
mulation; in contrast, final sales continued to rise at a
subdued rate. Meanwhile, several indicators of eco-
nomic activity had softened from the readings
observed earlier in the year, raising concerns about the
durability of the recovery. Later in the year, however,
the tone of the incoming data on economic activity
brightened somewhat, final sales strengthened, and the
recovery appeared to be on a firmer footing.
Since the middle of 2010, consumer spending has
risen solidly on average, businesses have continued to
increase their outlays for equipment and software, and
exports have moved up further. In contrast, construc-
tion of new homes and nonresidential buildings
remains exceptionally weak. Conditions in the labor
market have improved only slowly, with payrolls
increasing at a modest pace. Throughout nearly all of
2010, that pace of employment expansion was insuffi-
cient to bring the unemployment rate down meaning-
fully from its recent peak. In December 2010 and Janu-
ary of this year, however, the unemployment rate is
estimated to have dropped more noticeably, even
though payroll employment gains remained lackluster.
Meanwhile, long-duration joblessness persisted at
near-record levels. With regard to inflation develop-
ments, despite rapid increases in commodity prices,
longer-term inflation expectations have remained
stable and consumer price inflation has continued to
trend downward on net (figure 2).
Conditions in financial markets generally improved
over the course of the second half of 2010 and early
2011 and continued to be supportive of economic
activity. This improvement reflected, in part, additional
monetary policy stimulus provided by the Federal
Reserve, as well as growing investor confidence in the
sustainability of the economic recovery. Although
yields on Treasury securities rose somewhat, on net,
since mid-2010, yields on investment-grade corporate
bonds were little changed at low levels, and yields on
speculative-grade bonds declined. In equity markets,
price indexes generally rose, buoyed by solid corporate
earnings and a more positive economic outlook. Com-
mercial banks reported that they had eased some of
their lending standards and terms, though lending
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5nesses and households continued to face difficulties
obtaining credit. Changes in interest rates faced by
households were mixed. The improvement in financial
conditions was accompanied by some signs of a
pickup in the demand for credit. Borrower credit qual-
ity generally improved, although problems persisted in
some sectors of the economy. Concerns about Euro-
pean banking and fiscal strains increased again in late
2010 after having eased for a time; however, in contrast
to what was observed in the spring, these concerns left
little imprint on U.S. financial markets.
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS
The Household Sector
Consumer Spending and Household Finance
Real personal consumption expenditures (PCE)
increased at an annual rate of about 3¼ percent in the
second half of 2010, with a particularly brisk rise in
the fourth quarter (figure 3). The spending gains were
supported by the continued, though modest, pickup in
real household incomes, by some fading of the
restraining effects of the earlier sharp declines in
households’ net worth, and by a modest improvement
in the availability of consumer credit. Outlays for
durable goods also may have been boosted to some
extent by purchases that had been deferred during the
recession. The increases in spending exceeded the rise
in income, and the saving rate edged down during the
second half of the year, though it remains well above
levels that prevailed prior to the recession (figure 4).
The increase in consumer outlays in the second half
of 2010 partly reflected a step-up in sales of new light
motor vehicles (cars, sport utility vehicles, and pickup
trucks). Sales of light vehicles rose from an annual rate
of 11¼ million units in the second quarter of 2010 to
more than 12¼ million units in the fourth quarter and
moved up further in the first part of 2011. Sales were
supported, in part, by further improvements in credit
conditions for auto buyers as well as by more-generous
sales incentives from the automakers. Real spending in
other goods categories also rose appreciably, while the
increase in outlays for services was more subdued.
The determinants of consumer outlays showed fur-
ther, albeit gradual, improvement during the second
half of 2010. The level of real disposable personal
income (DPI)—after-tax income adjusted for infla-
tion—which rose rapidly in the first half of the year,
continued to advance in the second half, as real wages
and salaries moved up at an annual rate of 2 percent
(figure 5). The increase in real wage and salary income
reflected the continued, though tepid, recoveries in
both employment and hours worked; in contrast,
hourly pay was little changed in real terms.
The ratio of household net worth to DPI moved up
a little in the third quarter of 2010 and appears to have
risen further since then, as increases in equity values
likely more than offset further declines in house prices
(figure 6). Although the wealth-to-income ratio has
trended up since the beginning of 2009 and has
returned to the levels that prevailed prior to the late
1990s, it remains well below its highs in 2006 and 2007.
Consumer sentiment rose late in the year, boosted by
gradual improvements in household assessments of
financial and business conditions as well as job pros-
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NOTE: The data are quarterly and extend through 2010:Q4. 
SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
6 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress □ March 2011back to or a bit above the low levels that prevailed at
the start of last year (figure 7).
Household debt likely fell at just under a 2 percent
annual rate in the second half of 2010, a slightly slower
pace than in the first half. The contraction for 2010 as
a whole, which was due primarily to ongoing decreases
in mortgage debt, marked the second consecutive
annual decline. The reduction in overall household
debt levels, combined with increases in personal
income, resulted in a further decline in the ratio of
household debt to income and in the debt service
ratio—the required principal and interest payments on
existing mortgage and consumer debt relative to
income (figure 8).
The slowdown in the rate at which household debt
contracted in the latter part of 2010 stemmed in large
part from a modest recovery in consumer credit.
Although revolving consumer credit—mostly credit
card borrowing—continued to contract, the decline
was at a slightly slower rate than in the first half of the
year. Nonrevolving consumer credit, which consists
largely of auto and student loans and accounts for
about two-thirds of total consumer credit, rose 2 per-
cent in the second half of 2010 after being about
unchanged in the first half of the year. The pickup in
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NOTE: The data are quarterly and extend through 2010:Q3. The wealth-
to-income ratio is the ratio of household net worth to disposable personal
income. 
SOURCE: For net worth, Federal Reserve Board, flow of funds data; for
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7. Consumer sentiment indexes, 1997–2011  
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NOTE: The Conference Board data are monthly and extend through
February 2011; the series is indexed to equal 100 in 1985. The Thomson
Reuters/University of Michigan data are monthly and extend through
February 2011; the series is indexed to equal 100 in 1966. 
SOURCE: The Conference Board and Thomson Reuters/University of
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8. Household debt service, 1980–2010  
NOTE: The data are quarterly and extend through 2010:Q3. Debt service
payments consist of estimated required payments on outstanding mortgage
and consumer debt. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, “Household Debt Service and Financial
Obligations Ratios,” statistical release. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 7responses to the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey
on Bank Lending Practices (SLOOS) indicating that
banks have become increasingly willing to make con-
sumer installment loans; however, lending standards
for these loans likely remained fairly tight.
2 In addi-
tion, in the most recent survey, a small net fraction of
respondents noted increased demand for consumer
loans, the first time stronger demand was reported
since mid-2005.
Some of the increased willingness to make consumer
loans may reflect improvements in consumer credit
quality. The delinquency rate on auto loans at captive
finance companies moved down in the second half of
2010 to 2.6 percent, close to its longer-run historical
average. Delinquency rates on credit cards at commer-
cial banks and in securitized pools also moved down to
around longer-run averages. However, charge-off rates
on such loans remained well above historical norms
despite having moved lower in the second half of the
year.
Changes in interest rates on consumer loans were
mixed. Interest rates on new auto loans were little
changed, on net, in the second half of 2010 and into
2011. By contrast, interest rates on credit cards gener-
ally rose over the same period. A portion of the
increase in credit card interest rates may be due to lin-
gering adjustments by banks to the imposition of new
rules under the Credit Card Accountability Responsi-
bility and Disclosure Act (Credit Card Act).
3
Issuance of consumer asset-backed securities (ABS)
in the second half of 2010 occurred at about the same
pace as in the first half of the year. Auto loan ABS
issuance continued to be healthy, and the ability to
securitize these loans likely held down interest rates on
the underlying loans. Issuance of ABS backed by
credit card loans, however, remained very weak, as the
sharp contraction in credit card lending limited the
need for new funding and accounting rule changes
implemented at the beginning of 2010 made securitiza-
tion of these loans less attractive.
4 Yields on ABS secu-
rities and the spreads of such yields over comparable-
maturity interest rate swap rates were not much
changed, on net, over the second half of 2010 and
early 2011 (figure 9).
Residential Investment and Housing Finance
Housing activity remained depressed in the second half
of 2010. Homebuilding continues to be restrained by
sluggish demand, the large inventory of foreclosed or
distressed properties on the market, and the tight
credit conditions faced by homebuilders. In the single-
family sector, new units were started at an average
annual rate of about 430,000 units from July 2010 to
January 2011, just 70,000 units above the quarterly low
reached in the first quarter of 2009 (figure 10). In the
multifamily market, demand for apartments appears to
be increasing and occupancy rates have been edging
up, as some potential homebuyers may be choosing to
rent rather than to purchase a home. Nevertheless, the
inventory of unoccupied multifamily units continues to
be elevated, and construction financing remains tight.
As a result, starts in the multifamily sector have aver-
aged an annual rate of only 135,000 units since the
middle of 2010, well below the 300,000-unit rate that
had prevailed for much of the previous decade.
Home sales surged in the spring ahead of the expira-
tion of the homebuyer tax credit, plunged for a few
months during a payback period, and then recovered
somewhat as the payback effect waned.
5 By late 2010
2. The SLOOS is available on the Federal Reserve Board’s website
at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SnLoanSurvey.
3. The Credit Card Act includes some provisions that place
restrictions on issuers’ ability to impose certain fees and to engage in
risk-based pricing.
4. In June 2009, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) published Statements of Financial Accounting Standards
Nos. 166 (Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets, an Amend-
ment of FASB Statement No. 140) and 167 (Amendments to FASB
Interpretation No. 46(R)). The statements became effective at the
start of a company’s first fiscal year beginning after November 15,
2009, or, for companies reporting earnings on a calendar-year basis,
after January 1, 2010.
5. In order to receive the homebuyer tax credit, a purchaser had to
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SOURCE: JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
8 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress □ March 2011and early 2011, sales of existing single-family homes
were a bit above levels that prevailed in mid-2009,
before the enactment of the first homebuyer tax credit,
while sales of new single-family homes remained below
their mid-2009 levels. Housing demand has been held
back by tight mortgage credit availability, uncertainty
about future real estate values, and continued house-
hold concerns about the outlook for employment and
income. Nonetheless, other determinants of housing
demand are favorable and hold the potential to provide
support to home sales as the economic recovery pro-
ceeds. In particular, the low level of mortgage rates and
the earlier declines in house prices have made housing
more affordable for those able to obtain mortgages.
House prices, as measured by several national
indexes, decreased in the latter half of 2010 after hav-
ing shown tentative signs of leveling off earlier in the
year (figure 11). According to one measure with wide
geographic coverage—the CoreLogic repeat-sales
index—house prices fell 6 percent between June and
December and moved below their mid-2009 trough.
House prices continued to be weighed down by the
large inventory of unsold homes—especially distressed
properties—and by the sluggish demand for housing.
Indicators of credit quality in this sector pointed to
continued difficulties amid depressed home values and
elevated unemployment. Serious delinquency rates on
prime and near-prime mortgages edged down to
around 15 percent for adjustable-rate loans and to
about 5 percent for fixed-rate loans—levels that remain
high by historical standards (figure 12). Delinquency
rates for subprime mortgages moved up slightly toward
the end of the year and remained extremely elevated.
One sign of improvement, however, was that the rate at
which mortgages transitioned from being current to
property by the end of September. The first-time homebuyer tax
credit, which was enacted in February 2009 as part of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, was originally scheduled to expire
on November 30, 2009. Shortly before it expired, the Congress
extended the credit to sales occurring through April 30, 2010, and
expanded it to include repeat homebuyers who had owned and occu-
pied a house for at least five of the past eight years. Sales of existing
homes are measured at closing, while sales of new homes are meas-
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NOTE: The data are monthly and extend into 2010:Q4. Each index has been
normalized so that its peak is 100. Both the CoreLogic price index and the
FHFA index (formerly calculated by the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight) include purchase transactions only. The
S&P/Case-Shiller index reflects all arm’s-length sales transactions in selected
metropolitan areas. 
SOURCE: For CoreLogic, CoreLogic; for FHFA, Federal Housing Finance
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Delinquency rate is the percent of loans 90 days or more past due or in
foreclosure. 
SOURCE: For prime and near prime, LPS Applied Analytics; for subprime,
CoreLogic. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 9being newly delinquent trended lower toward the end
of 2010.
Reflecting the ongoing credit quality issues, the
number of homes that entered foreclosure in the third
quarter of 2010 jumped to more than 700,000, well
above the pace seen earlier in the year. Late in the third
quarter, concerns about the mishandling of documen-
tation led some institutions to temporarily suspend
some or all of their foreclosure proceedings.
6 Despite
these announced moratoriums, the pace of new fore-
closures dipped only slightly in the fourth quarter.
Moreover, these moratoriums will likely only extend,
and not put an end to, the foreclosure process in most
cases.
Interest rates on fixed-rate mortgages remained
quite low, on net, by historical standards during the
second half of 2010 and reached record lows in the
fourth quarter (figure 13). The very low levels of mort-
gage rates prompted a sizable pickup in refinancing
activity for a time, although some households were
unable to refinance because of depressed home values,
weak credit scores, and tight lending standards for
mortgages. Mortgage applications for home purchases
were generally subdued in the second half of the year.
Overall, mortgage debt outstanding likely declined in
the second half of 2010 at a pace only slightly slower
than that of the first half.
Net issuance of mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie
Mae was fairly low in the second half of 2010, consis-
tent with the subdued originations of mortgages used
to finance home purchases. The securitization market
for mortgage loans not guaranteed by a housing-
related government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) or the




Real business spending on equipment and software,
which surged in the first half of 2010, rose further in
the second half (figure 14). Firms were likely motivated
partly by a desire to replace aging equipment and to
undertake capital spending that had been deferred dur-
ing the recession. Improving business prospects also
appear to have been a factor boosting capital expendi-
tures. As a group, large firms continue to have ample
internal funds, and those with access to capital markets
generally have been able to obtain bond financing at
favorable terms. Although credit availability for smaller
firms and other bank-dependent businesses remains
constricted, some tentative signs of easing lending
standards have emerged.
Overall spending on equipment and software rose at
an annual rate of about 10 percent in the second half
of 2010. Although business outlays in the volatile
transportation equipment category plunged in the
fourth quarter, that decline came in the wake of several
quarters of sharp increases when vehicle rental firms
were rebuilding their fleets of cars and light trucks.
Meanwhile, spending on information technology (IT)
capital—computers, software, and communications
equipment—increased appreciably throughout the sec-
ond half. Gains were apparently spurred by outlays to
replace older, less-efficient IT capital as well as contin-
ued investments by wireless service providers to
upgrade their networks. In addition, spending
increases for equipment other than transportation and
IT—nearly one-half of total equipment outlays—were
well maintained and broad based. More recently, new
orders for nondefense capital goods other than trans-
portation and IT items were little changed, on net, in
6. The Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation are conducting an in-depth interagency
review of practices at the largest mortgage servicing operations to
examine foreclosure practices generally, but with an emphasis on the
breakdowns that led to inaccurate affidavits and other questionable
legal documents being used in the foreclosure process. See Elizabeth
A. Duke (2010), “Foreclosure Documentation Issues,” statement
before the Financial Services Subcommittee on Housing and
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13. Mortgage interest rates, 1995–2011  
Adjustable rate
NOTE: The data, which are weekly and extend through February 23, 2011,
are contract rates on 30-year mortgages. 
SOURCE: Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. 
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remains above shipments, and business surveys sug-
gest that respondents are upbeat about business con-
ditions as well as their equipment spending plans.
Real spending on nonresidential structures other
than those used for drilling and mining remained
depressed, with the level of investment at the end of
2010 down almost 40 percent from its peak in early
2008. However, the rate of decline appears to be abat-
ing: Spending fell at an annual rate of nearly 10 per-
cent in the second half of 2010 after plunging at a
25 percent rate in the first half. Although outlays for
new power facilities jumped in the second half of the
year, construction of office buildings, commercial
structures, and manufacturing plants all moved down
further. A large overhang of vacant space, depressed
property prices, and an unwillingness of banks to add
to their already high construction loan exposure still
weighed heavily on the sector. In contrast, spending
on drilling and mining structures continued to rise
sharply in response to elevated energy prices.
Inventory Investment
Stockbuilding continued in the second half of 2010 at
an average pace about in line with the growth of final
sales (figure 15). Inventory investment surged in the
third quarter, but the pace of accumulation slowed
sharply in the fourth quarter, with the swing magnified
by developments in the motor vehicle sector. Vehicle
stocks rose appreciably in the third quarter as dealers
attempted to rebuild inventories that had become
depleted earlier in the year, but inventories fell in the
fourth quarter as auto sales moved up more rapidly
than expected near the end of the year. As for other
items aside from motor vehicles, inventory investment
rose during the second half of the year, albeit more
rapidly in the third quarter than in the fourth. The
inventory-to-sales ratios for most industries covered by
the Census Bureau’s book-value data, which had risen
significantly in 2009, have moved back to levels that
prevailed before the recession, and surveys suggest that
inventory positions for most businesses generally are in
a comfortable range.
Corporate Profits and Business Finance
Operating earnings per share for S&P 500 firms contin-
ued to increase at a solid pace in the third and fourth
quarters of 2010. Most industry groups reported gains.
In aggregate, earnings per share climbed to near the
levels posted in mid-2007, just prior to the financial
crisis.
The already sturdy credit quality of nonfinancial
corporations improved further in the second half of
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NOTE: High-tech equipment consists of computers and peripheral equip-
ment and communications equipment. 
SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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15. Change in real business inventories, 2004–10  
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SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 11an indication of corporate leverage, moved down in the
third quarter, as nonfinancial corporations increased
their assets by more than they increased their debt.
Credit rating upgrades again outpaced downgrades
and corporate bond defaults remained sparse. The
delinquency rate on commercial and industrial (C&I)
loans at commercial banks moved down in the second
half of 2010 to 3 percent. By contrast, with fundamen-
tals remaining weak, delinquency and charge-off rates
on commercial real estate (CRE) loans at commercial
banks decreased only modestly from quite elevated
levels (figure 16). Moreover, the delinquency rate on
CRE loans in securitized pools continued to rise
sharply.
Borrowing by nonfinancial corporations continued
at a robust pace in the second half of 2010, driven by
good corporate credit quality, attractive financing con-
ditions, and an improving economic outlook (fig-
ure 17). Issuance of corporate bonds was heavy for
both investment-grade and high-yield issues. Borrow-
ing in the syndicated loan market was also sizable, par-
ticularly by speculative-grade borrowers, with the dol-
lar volume of such loans rebounding sharply from the
low levels seen in 2008 and 2009 (not shown in figure).
Demand for such loans from institutional investors
was strong. Some of the strength in debt origination
was reportedly due to corporations taking advantage
of low interest rates to reduce debt service costs and
extend maturities by refinancing; issuance to finance
mergers and acquisitions also reportedly picked up in
the second half of the year. Meanwhile, commercial
paper outstanding remained about flat. C&I loans on
banks’ books decreased during the third quarter but
started expanding toward the end of the year, consis-
tent with responses to the January 2011 SLOOS that
reported some easing of standards and terms and
some firming of demand for C&I loans from large
firms over the previous three months. Relatively large
fractions of respondents to the most recent survey
indicated that they narrowed the spread of C&I loan
rates over their cost of funds somewhat further during
the second half of 2010 (figure 18). Nevertheless, lend-
ing standards reportedly remained tight; about one-
half of the respondents to special questions included in
the October 2010 survey indicated that their lending
standards on C&I loans were tighter than longer-run
averages and were likely to remain so until at least
2012.
Borrowing conditions for small businesses continued
to be tighter than for larger firms, although some signs
of easing began to emerge. In particular, surveys con-
ducted by the National Federation of Independent
Business (NFIB) showed a gradual decline in the share
of respondents reporting that credit was more difficult
to obtain than three months previously (figure 19).
Similarly, in the past several surveys, moderate net
fractions of SLOOS respondents have indicated that
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NOTE: The data for commercial banks and life insurance companies are
quarterly and extend through 2010:Q4 and 2010:Q3, respectively. The data
for commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) are monthly and extend
through January 2011. The delinquency rates for commercial banks and
CMBS are the percent of loans 30 days or more past due or not accruing
interest. The delinquency rate for life insurance companies is the percent of
loans 60 days or more past due or not accruing interest. 
SOURCE: For commercial banks, Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council, Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call
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12 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress □ March 2011ers. Judging from responses to both the NFIB survey
and the SLOOS, loan demand by small businesses
remained subdued.
Banks’ holdings of CRE loans continued to contract
fairly sharply throughout the second half of 2010.
Overall commercial mortgage debt declined at an
annual rate of 6 percent in the third quarter, about the
same pace as in the previous quarter. Responses to the
January SLOOS suggest that banks have not yet
started reversing their tight lending standards in this
sector and that demand, while starting to pick up,
likely remained weak. Despite the strains in CRE mar-
kets, the commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) market showed tentative signs of improve-
ment in the second half of 2010 and early 2011. Prices
for some of the more highly rated tranches of existing
CMBS rose. Although issuance of new securities
remained tepid, the pace has been picking up.
Responses to special questions on the September
Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer
Financing Terms (SCOOS) indicated that demand for
warehousing of CRE loans for securitization had
increased since the beginning of 2010, and that the
willingness to fund CRE loans on an interim basis had
increased somewhat.
A substantial number of initial and secondary equity
offerings for nonfinancial firms were brought to mar-
ket in the second half of 2010. Deals included an initial
public offering by General Motors that was used to
repay a portion of the government’s capital infusion.
Nevertheless, equity retirements in the third quarter
through cash-financed mergers and acquisitions and
share repurchases once again outpaced issuance; pre-
liminary data for the fourth quarter (not shown) sug-
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18. Net percentage of domestic banks tightening standards  
and widening spreads over the banks’ cost of funds for  
large and medium-sized business borrowers, 1998–2011  
Spreads
NOTE: The data are drawn from a survey generally conducted four times
per year; the last observation is from the January 2011 survey, which covers
2010:Q4. Net percentage is the percentage of banks reporting a tightening of
standards or a widening of spreads less the percentage reporting an easing or
a narrowing. The definition for firm size suggested for, and generally used
by, survey respondents is that large and medium-sized firms have annual
sales of $50 million or more. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on









2011 2007 2003 1999 1995 1991
19. Net percentage of small businesses that reported more  
difficulty in obtaining credit, 1990–2011  
NOTE: The data are drawn from a survey conducted monthly and are
seasonally adjusted; the last observation is from the January 2011 survey,
which covers December 2010. The data reflect the proportion of borrowers
who sought credit in the past three months that reported more difficulty in
obtaining credit less the proportion that reported more ease in obtaining
credit. 
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20. Components of net equity issuance, 2005–10  
Total
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NOTE: The data for 2010:Q3 are estimates. Net equity issuance is the
difference between equity issued by domestic companies in public or private
markets and equity retired through share repurchases, domestic cash-financed
mergers, or foreign takeovers of U.S. firms. Equity issuance includes funds
invested by private equity partnerships and stock option proceeds. 
SOURCE: Thomson Financial, Investment Benchmark Report; Money Tree
Report by PricewaterhouseCoopers, National Venture Capital Association,
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Federal Government
The deficit in the federal unified budget has remained
very wide. The budget deficit for fiscal year 2010,
although down somewhat from fiscal 2009, was
$1.3 trillion. The fiscal 2010 figure was equal to
8¾ percent of nominal GDP, substantially above the
average value of 2 percent recorded during the three-
year period prior to the onset of the recession. The
budget deficit continued to be boosted by spending
commitments from the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act (ARRA) and other stimulus policy
actions and by the weakness of the economy, which
has reduced tax revenues and boosted payments for
income support. By contrast, the budget effects of sev-
eral financial transactions reduced the deficit in 2010:
Outlays related to the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP), which added significantly to the deficit in
2009, helped to shrink the deficit in 2010 as estimated
losses were revised down when many of the larger
TARP recipients repaid their obligations to the Treas-
ury; in addition, new assistance for the mortgage-
related GSEs was extended at a slower pace, and
depository institutions prepaid three years’ worth of
federal deposit insurance premiums. Moreover, the
nascent recovery in the economy led to a small increase
in revenues. The deficit is projected by the Congres-
sional Budget Office to widen in fiscal 2011 to a level
similar to the shortfall recorded in fiscal 2009.
Despite increasing 3 percent in fiscal 2010, tax
receipts remained at very low levels; indeed, at less
than 15 percent of GDP, the ratio of receipts to
national income was at its lowest level in 60 years (fig-
ure 21). Corporate income taxes surged nearly 40 per-
cent in fiscal 2010 as profits increased briskly, and Fed-
eral Reserve remittances to the Treasury rose markedly
owing to the expansion of its balance sheet. By con-
trast, despite rising household incomes, individual
income and payroll taxes moved down in fiscal 2010,
reflecting the tax cuts put in place by the ARRA. Total
tax receipts increased nearly 10 percent over the first
four months of fiscal 2011 relative to the comparable
year-earlier period; individual income and payroll
taxes turned up, a consequence of the further recovery
in household incomes, and corporate income taxes
continued to rise.
Outlays decreased 2 percent in fiscal 2010, a devel-
opment attributable to financial transactions. Exclud-
ing financial transactions, spending rose 9 percent
compared with fiscal 2009, mainly because of the
effects of the weak labor market on outlays for income
support programs (such as unemployment insurance
and food stamps) as well as increases in Medicaid
expenditures and spending associated with the ARRA
and other stimulus-related policies. Net interest pay-
ments rose 5 percent in fiscal 2010, and Social Security
spending increased 3½ percent—its smallest rise in
11 years—as the low rate of consumer price inflation
in the previous year resulted in no cost of living adjust-
ment. In the first four months of fiscal 2011, total fed-
eral outlays rose nearly 5 percent relative to the compa-
rable year-earlier period. Excluding financial
transactions, outlays were up about 1 percent. The
relatively small increase so far this fiscal year for out-
lays excluding financial transactions reflects a flatten-
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21. Federal receipts and expenditures, 1990–2010  
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NOTE: The receipts and expenditures data are on a unified-budget basis and
are for fiscal years (October through September); gross domestic product
(GDP) is for the four quarters ending in Q3. 
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22. Change in real government expenditures  
on consumption and investment, 2004–10  
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SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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14 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress □ March 2011ments; by contrast, other spending has been increasing
at rates comparable to those recorded during fiscal
2010.
As measured in the national income and product
accounts (NIPA), real federal expenditures on con-
sumption and gross investment—the part of federal
spending that is a direct component of GDP—rose at
an annual rate of about 4 percent in the second half of
2010, a bit less than in the first half of the year (fig-
ure 22). Nondefense outlays increased more slowly
than in the first half of the year—when spending for
the decennial census ramped up—while defense spend-
ing rose at roughly the same pace as in the first half.
Federal Borrowing
Federal debt expanded appreciably in the second half
of last year, though at a slightly slower pace than in the
first half. The ratio of Federal debt held by the public
to nominal GDP rose to more than 60 percent at the
end of 2010 and is projected to reach nearly 70 percent
by the end of 2011 (figure 23). Demand for Treasury
securities has been well maintained. Bid-to-cover ratios
at auctions, although somewhat mixed, were generally
within historical ranges during the second half of 2010
and early 2011. Indicators of foreign participation at
auctions as well as a rise in foreign custody holdings of
Treasury securities by the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York pointed to steady demand from abroad.
Demand for these securities may have been supported
by a heightened desire for relatively safe and liquid
assets in light of fiscal troubles in some European
countries.
State and Local Government
Despite the substantial federal aid provided by the
ARRA, state and local governments remained under
significant fiscal pressure in the second half of 2010.
The strains reflect several factors, including a sharp
drop in tax revenues in late 2008 and 2009 and
increased commitments for Medicaid outlays—a cycli-
cally sensitive transfer program—all in the context of
balanced budget requirements. To address their budget
shortfalls, these governments have been paring back
operating expenditures. Indeed, real consumption
expenditures of state and local governments, as meas-
ured in the NIPA, fell about 1 percent in 2010 after
decreasing a similar amount in 2009. The weakness in
spending was reflected in the continued reductions in
payrolls. Total employment of state and local govern-
ments fell 250,000 during 2010, with nearly all of the
cutbacks at the local level. Construction spending
undertaken by these governments was volatile during
2010 but, on net, was down a bit for the year and
remained below the level that prevailed before the
recession despite the infrastructure grants provided by
the federal government as part of the ARRA. While
most capital expenditures are not subject to balanced
budget requirements, some of these expenditures are
funded out of operating budgets subject to these
requirements. In addition, a substantial share of debt
service payments on the bonds used to finance capital
projects is made out of operating budgets—a factor
that may be limiting the willingness of governments to
undertake some new infrastructure projects.
With overall economic activity recovering, state gov-
ernment revenues from income, business, and sales
taxes rose in the second half of 2010. Nevertheless,
state tax collections remain well below their pre-
recession levels, and available balances in reserve funds
are low. Tax collections at the local level have fared
relatively better. In particular, some localities appear to
have adjusted statutory tax rates so that declining real
estate assessments, which typically significantly lag
market prices, are holding down property tax revenues
by less than they otherwise would. However, many
localities have seen sharp cutbacks in their grants-in-
aid from state governments, and thus have experienced
significant fiscal pressures. State and local governments
will continue to face considerable budget strains, in
part because federal stimulus grants will be winding
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23. Federal government debt held by the public, 1960–2010  
NOTE: The data for debt are as of year-end; the observation for 2010 is an
estimate. The corresponding values for gross domestic product (GDP) are for
Q4 at an annual rate. Excludes securities held as investments of federal
government accounts. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, flow of funds data. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 15will need to set aside additional resources in coming
years both to meet their pension obligations and to pay
for health benefits provided to their retired employees.
State and Local Government Borrowing
Issuance of securities by state and local governments
was robust during the latter half of 2010; it surged
near the end of the year as state governments sought
to take advantage of the Build America Bond program
before the program expired.
7 Issuance of short-term
municipal securities was also strong.
Yields on state and local government bonds rose
noticeably more than those on comparable-maturity
Treasury securities in the second half of 2010 and early
2011. The rise in yields on municipal securities may
have reflected increased concerns about the fiscal posi-
tion and financial health of state and local govern-
ments, although the heavy supply of these securities
coming to market likely also played a role. Spreads on
credit default swaps for some states remained volatile
but narrowed, on net, from their peak levels last sum-
mer. Downgrades of the credit ratings of state and
local governments continued to outpace upgrades dur-
ing the second half of 2010. Nonetheless, the pace of
actual defaults on municipal issues continued to come
down from its peak in 2008. In recent months, there
were substantial outflows from long-term mutual funds
that invest in municipal bonds.
The External Sector
Supported by the expansion of foreign economic activ-
ity, real exports of goods and services continued to
increase at a solid pace in the second half of 2010, ris-
ing at an annual rate of 8¼ percent (figure 24). Nearly
all major categories of exports rose, with exports of
machinery, agricultural goods, and services registering
the largest gains. Moreover, the increase in export
demand was broad based across trading partners.
Real imports of goods and services decelerated con-
siderably in the second half of 2010, increasing at an
annual rate of only 1¼ percent after surging more than
20 percent during the first half of last year. The sharp
step-down partly reflected an unusually large decline in
real oil imports, but more important, the growth in
non-oil imports moderated to a pace more in line with
the expansion in U.S. economic activity. During the
second half of 2010, imports of consumer goods,
machinery, and services posted the largest increases. As
with exports, the increase in imports occurred across a
wide range of trading partners.
All told, net exports shaved ½ percentage point off
real GDP growth last year as the rebound in imports
outpaced the recovery in exports for the year as a
whole. The current account deficit widened from
$378 billion in 2009 to an average of $479 billion at an
annual rate, or about 3¼ percent of nominal GDP, in
the first three quarters of 2010 (figure 25).
The spot price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI)
crude oil moved higher over the second half of the
7. The Build America Bond program allowed state and local
governments to issue taxable bonds for capital projects and receive a
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25. U.S. trade and current account balances, 2002–10  
Trade
NOTE: The data are quarterly. For the trade account, the data extend
through 2010:Q4; for the current account, they extend through 2010:Q3. GDP
is gross domestic product. 
SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
16 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress □ March 2011year, rising to an average of $89 per barrel in Decem-
ber, about $11 above the average price that prevailed
over the first six months of the year (figure 26). The
upward movement in oil prices during the second half
of the year largely reflected a widespread strengthening
in global oil demand, particularly in emerging market
economies (EMEs), against a backdrop of constrained
supply. The depreciation of the dollar over this period
also contributed somewhat to the rise in the price of
oil. Spot WTI continued to fluctuate around its
December average for much of the first two months of
this year but moved up sharply in late February.
8
Unrest in several Middle Eastern and North African
countries, and uncertainty about its potential implica-
tions for global oil supply, has put considerable
upward pressure on oil prices in recent weeks.
The price of the long-term futures contract for crude
oil (expiring in December 2019) has generally fluctu-
ated in the neighborhood of $95 per barrel over the
past six months, not much different from the average
over the first half of 2010, although it has moved up
some recently. Accordingly, the sharply upward sloping
futures curve that characterized the oil market since
the onset of the financial crisis has flattened consider-
ably. Concurrent with this flattening of the futures
curve, measured global inventories of crude oil have
declined in recent months, although they remain high
by historical standards.
Nonfuel commodity prices also rose markedly over
the second half of the year and into early 2011, with
increases broad based across a variety of commodities.
As with oil, these prices have been supported by
strengthening global economic activity, primarily in
China as well as in other EMEs, and, to a lesser extent,
by the lower dollar. In addition, adverse weather con-
ditions have reduced harvests and curtailed supplies of
important agricultural products in a number of key
exporting countries, including Russia, Ukraine, and
the United States.
Prices of non-oil imported goods rose 1¼ percent at
an annual rate over the second half of 2010 and have
increased at an accelerated pace in January, boosted by
higher commodity prices, the depreciation of the U.S.
dollar, and foreign inflation. On net, non-oil import
prices rose a bit more slowly over the second half of
2010 than in the first half and finished the year 2 per-
cent higher than at the end of 2009.
National Saving
Total net national saving—that is, the saving of house-
holds, businesses, and governments excluding deprecia-
tion charges—remains low by historical standards (fig-
ure 27). After having reached 3¾ percent of nominal
GDP in 2006, net national saving dropped steadily
over the subsequent three years, reaching roughly
negative 3 percent in the third quarter of 2009. The
widening of the federal budget deficit during the
course of the recession more than accounted for the
downswing in net saving. Since late 2009, net national
8. The prices of other grades of crude oil have risen by more over
the first two months of this year as the high level of inventories accu-
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27. Net saving, 1990–2010  
Nonfederal saving
NOTE: The data are quarterly and extend through 2010:Q3. Nonfederal
saving is the sum of personal and net business saving and the net saving of
state and local governments. GDP is gross domestic product. 
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26. Prices of oil and nonfuel commodities, 2006–11  
December 2005 = 100
Nonfuel
commodities
NOTE:        The data are monthly.  The oil price is the spot price of  West Texas
       Intermediate   crude   oil,   and   the   last   observation   is   the   average   for
February 1–22, 2011. The price of nonfuel commodities is an index of 45
primary-commodity prices and extends through January 2011. 
SOURCE: For oil, the Commodity Research Bureau; for nonfuel
commodities, International Monetary Fund. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 17saving has moved up, reflecting a sharp rise in private
saving. Nonetheless, the total averaged about negative
1 percent in the third quarter of 2010 (the latest avail-
able data), and the large federal deficit will likely keep
it at low levels in the near term. Currently, real interest
rates are still low despite the depressed rate of national
saving. If national saving were to remain low as the
economy recovers, interest rates would likely experi-
ence upward pressure, capital formation rates would
likely be low, and borrowing from abroad would likely
be heavy. In combination, such developments would
limit the rise in the standard of living of U.S. residents
and hamper the ability of the nation to meet the retire-
ment needs of an aging population.
The Labor Market
Employment and Unemployment
Conditions in the labor market have continued to
improve only slowly since the middle of 2010. Private
payroll employment rose just 120,000 per month, on
average, over the second half of last year, and payroll
employment gains remained lackluster in January of
2011 (figure 28).
9 All told, only about one-seventh of
the 8¾ million jobs lost from the beginning of 2008 to
the trough in private payrolls in February 2010 have
been recovered. Rather than adding jobs briskly, busi-
nesses have been achieving much of their desired
increases in labor input over the past year by lengthen-
ing the hours worked by their employees; indeed, by
January, the average workweek had recouped more
than one-half of its decrease during the recession.
For most of last year, the overall net increase in hir-
ing was barely sufficient to accommodate the increase
in the size of the labor force, and the unemployment
rate remained at or above 9½ percent through Novem-
ber (figure 29). However, the unemployment rate is
estimated to have moved down noticeably in December
and January, reaching 9.0 percent—about 1 percentage
point below the highest reading during this episode.
The recent decline in the jobless rate is encouraging,
but the extent of the improvement in underlying labor-
market conditions is, as yet, difficult to judge. The level
of unemployment remains very elevated, and long-
duration joblessness continues to account for an espe- 9. Total employment—private plus government—exhibited sharp
swings from March 2010 to September 2010 as a result of the hiring
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28. Net change in private payroll employment, 2004–11  
NOTE: The data are monthly and extend through January 2011. 
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29. Civilian unemployment rate, 1977–2011  
NOTE: The data are monthly and extend through January 2011. 
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30. Long-term unemployed, 1977–2011  
NOTE: The data are monthly and extend through January 2011. The series
shown is the percentage of total unemployed persons who have been
unemployed for more than 26 weeks. 
SOURCE: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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nearly 6¼ million persons among those counted as
unemployed—about 44 percent of the total—had been
out of work for more than six months, figures that
were only a little below record levels observed in the
middle of 2010 (figure 30).
10 Moreover, the number of
individuals who are working part time for economic
reasons—another indicator of the underutilization of
labor—remained roughly twice its pre-recession value.
Meanwhile, the labor force participation rate moved
down further in the second half of the year (figure 31).
The decline in participation was mainly concentrated
among men aged 25 and over without a college degree.
Several other indicators of labor market conditions,
however, have brightened a bit recently. After showing
little progress over the first half of the year, initial
claims for unemployment insurance (an indicator of
the pace of layoffs) generally have trended down in
recent months. Moreover, survey measures of labor
market expectations—such as business plans for future
hiring and consumer attitudes about future labor mar-
ket conditions—improved, on net, over the second half
of 2010 and early this year after having softened
around the middle of last year.
Productivity and Labor Compensation
Labor productivity rose further in the second half of
2010. According to the most recent published data,
output per hour in the nonfarm business sector
increased at an annual rate of about 2½ percent over
that period (figure 32). Productivity had surged in 2009
as firms aggressively eliminated many operational inef-
ficiencies and reduced their labor input in an environ-
ment of severe economic stress. Although the recent
gains in productivity have been less rapid, firms none-
theless continue to make efforts to improve the effi-
ciency of their operations, and they appear to remain
reluctant to increase staffing levels in a climate of lin-
gering economic uncertainty.
Increases in hourly compensation remained subdued
in 2010, restrained by the wide margin of labor market
slack (figure 33). The employment cost index (ECI) for
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NOTE: The data are monthly and extend through January 2011. 
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quarter of the year immediately preceding the period. 

















2010 2008 2006 2004 2002 2000




NOTE: The data are quarterly and extend through 2010:Q4. For nonfarm
business compensation, change is over four quarters; for the employment cost
index (ECI), change is over the 12 months ending in the last month of each
quarter. The nonfarm business sector excludes farms, government, nonprofit
institutions, and households. The sector covered by the ECI used here is the
nonfarm business sector plus nonprofit institutions. 
SOURCE: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 19private industry workers, which measures both wages
and the cost to employers of providing benefits, rose
just 2 percent in nominal terms in 2010—up from an
especially small increase in 2009 but still lower than the
roughly 3 percent pace averaged in the several years
preceding the recession. The rise in the ECI last year
reflected a pickup in the growth of benefits, after a
subdued increase in 2009, and a modest acceleration in
wages and salaries. Nominal compensation per hour in
the nonfarm business sector—derived from the labor
compensation data in the NIPA—increased only
1½ percent in 2010, well below the average gain of
about 4 percent in the years before the recession. After
adjusting for the rise in consumer prices, hourly com-
pensation was little changed in 2010. Because nominal
hourly compensation and labor productivity in the
nonfarm business sector rose at roughly the same pace
in 2010, unit labor costs were about flat last year. Dur-
ing the preceding year, unit labor costs had plunged
3½ percent as a result of the moderate rise in nominal
hourly compensation and the sizable advance in output
per hour.
Prices
Consumer price inflation has been trending downward,
on net, and survey measures of longer-term inflation
expectations have remained stable, despite the rapid
increases in a variety of commodity prices during the
second half of 2010. Overall prices for personal con-
sumption expenditures increased 1¼ percent over the
12 months ending in January 2011, compared with a
rise of 2½ percent in the preceding 12-month period
(figure 2). The core PCE price index—which excludes
the prices of energy items as well as those of food and
beverages—increased just ¾ percent over the
12 months ending in January, down from a 1¾ percent
rise over the preceding 12 months.
The index of consumer energy prices, which declined
in the first half of 2010, rose rapidly during the second
half of the year and early 2011. The index was boosted
by a surge in the prices of gasoline and home heating
oil, which reflected the run-up in the price of crude oil
that began in late summer. In contrast, consumer natu-
ral gas prices fell as increases in supply from new
domestic wells helped boost inventories above typical
levels. All told, the overall index of consumer energy
prices rose nearly 7 percent during the 12 months end-
ing in January 2011.
The index of consumer food prices rose 1¾ percent
over the 12 months ending in January 2011 as the
prices of beef and pork posted sizable increases. The
price of fruits and vegetables ran up briskly early in
2010 following a couple of damaging freezes, but these
prices turned down in the second half of the year, leav-
ing them up only slightly for the year as a whole. How-
ever, spot prices in commodity markets for crops and
for livestock moved up sharply toward the end of last
year, pointing to some upward pressure on consumer
food prices in the first part of 2011.
The slowdown in core PCE price inflation over the
past year was particularly evident in the prices of
goods other than food and energy, which fell 0.6 per-
cent over the 12 months ending in January 2011. The
decline in these core goods prices occurred despite siz-
able increases in the prices of some industrial com-
modities and materials; the modest degree of pass-
through from commodity input costs to retail prices
reflects the relatively small weight of materials inputs
in total production costs. Prices for services other than
energy rose about 1¼ percent over the 12 months end-
ing in January, down from an increase of almost 2 per-
cent in the preceding 12 months, as the continued
weakness in the housing market put downward pres-
sure on the rise in housing costs and as the wide mar-
gin of economic slack continued to restrain price
increases for other services.
The widespread slowing in inflation over the past
year is also apparent in a variety of alternative indica-
tors of the underlying trend in inflation (figure 34).
These indicators include trimmed-mean price indexes,
which exclude the most extreme price increases and
price declines in each period, and market-based mea-
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“nonmarket” prices) tend to be highly erratic.
Survey-based measures of near-term inflation expec-
tations have increased in recent months, likely reflect-
ing the recent run-up in energy and food prices; in con-
trast, survey-based measures of longer-term inflation
expectations have remained relatively stable over the
past year. In the Thomson Reuters/University of
Michigan Surveys of Consumers, median year-ahead
inflation remained between 2¾ percent and 3 percent
for most of 2010 but then rose above 3 percent in early
2011. Longer-term expectations in the survey, at
2.9 percent in February, remained in the narrow range
that has prevailed over the past few years. In the Sur-
vey of Professional Forecasters, conducted by the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, expectations for the
increase in the consumer price index over the next
10 years edged down, on balance, during 2010 after
having been essentially unchanged for many years.
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS
In light of the disappointing pace of the progress
toward the Federal Reserve’s dual objectives of maxi-
mum employment and price stability, the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) took steps in the second
half of the year to reduce downside risk to the sustain-
ability of the recovery and to provide further support
to economic activity. At its August 2010 meeting, the
FOMC decided to keep the Federal Reserve’s holdings
of longer-term securities constant at their then-current
level by reinvesting principal payments from holdings
of agency debt and agency MBS in longer-term Treas-
ury securities. In November, the FOMC announced its
intention to purchase a further $600 billion in longer-
term Treasury securities by the end of the second quar-
ter of 2011 (see box “The Effects of Federal Reserve
Asset Purchases”).
Financial market conditions, which had worsened
early in the summer as a result of developments in
Europe and concerns about the durability of the global
recovery, subsequently improved as investors increas-
ingly priced in further monetary policy accommoda-
tion. Accordingly, real Treasury yields declined, asset
prices increased, and credit spreads narrowed. A
brightening tone to the economic news starting in the
fall bolstered investor sentiment and, together with a
reassessment on the part of investors of the ultimate
size of Federal Reserve Treasury purchases, contrib-
uted to a backup in interest rates and in measures of
inflation compensation that continued through year-
end. In contrast to the developments earlier in the year,
the reemergence later in the year of concerns about the




In response to indications of a slowing pace of recov-
ery in U.S. output and employment and a continued
downward trend in measures of underlying inflation,
expectations regarding the path for the federal funds
rate during 2011 and 2012 were revised down sharply
in the third quarter and investors came to anticipate
further Federal Reserve asset purchases. The FOMC’s
decision to begin additional purchases of longer-term
Treasury securities occurred against the backdrop of
this downward shift in expectations about monetary
policy. Subsequently, expectations regarding the ulti-
mate size of such purchases were scaled back as the
recovery appeared to strengthen, downside risks to the
outlook seemed to recede somewhat, and a tax-cut deal
that was seen as supportive of economic activity was
passed into law.
The current target range for the federal funds rate of
0 to ¼ percent is consistent with the level that investors
expected at the end of June 2010. However, the date at
which monetary policy tightening is expected to com-
mence has moved back somewhat since the time of the
July 2010 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress.
Quotes on money market futures contracts indicate
that, as of late February, investors anticipate that the
federal funds rate will rise above its current range in
the first quarter of 2012, about a year later than the
date implied in July 2010. By the end of 2012, investors
expect that the effective federal funds rate will be
around 1.3 percent, fairly similar to the level antici-
pated in mid-2010.
11
Yields on nominal Treasury securities fluctuated
considerably in the second half of 2010 and in early
2011 due to shifts in investors’ expectations regarding
11. When interest rates are close to zero, determining the point at
which financial market quotes indicate that the federal funds rate will
move above its current range can be challenging. The path described
in the text is the mean of a distribution calculated from derivatives
contracts on federal funds and Eurodollars. The skewness induced in
this distribution by the zero lower bound causes the mean to be influ-
enced strongly by changes in uncertainty regarding the policy path,
complicating its interpretation. Alternatively, one can use similar
derivatives to calculate the most likely—or “modal”—path of the
federal funds rate, which tends to be more stable. This path has also
moved down, on net, since last summer, but it suggests a flatter over-
all trajectory for the target federal funds rate, according to which the
effective rate does not rise above its current level until around the
middle of 2012.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 21the prospects for economic growth and the size of any
asset purchase program that would be conducted by
the Federal Reserve (figure 35). Recently, Treasury
yields declined as investors increased their demand for
the relative safety and liquidity of Treasury securities
following political turmoil in the Middle East and
North Africa. On net, yields on 2-year Treasury notes
were up a bit from their levels in mid-2010, while those
on 10-year Treasury securities rose approximately
40 basis points. Nonetheless, yields on Treasury securi-
ties remained quite low by historical standards. Uncer-
tainty about longer-term interest rates, as measured by
the implied volatility on 10-year Treasury securities,
rose significantly from November to mid-December,
likely in part because of increased uncertainty about
the ultimate size of the Federal Reserve’s asset pur-
chase program. Interest rate uncertainty declined sub-
sequentlyandbyearly2011wasonlyabithigher,onnet,
than in mid-2010, apparently reflecting coalescing mar-
ket expectations regarding Federal Reserve purchases.
Measures of medium- and long-term inflation com-
pensation derived from inflation-indexed Treasury
The Effects of Federal Reserve Asset Purchases
Between late 2008 and early 2010, with short-term
interest rates already near zero, the Federal Reserve
provided additional monetary accommodation by
purchasing $1.25 trillion in agency mortgage-
backed securities (MBS), about $175 billion in
agency debt, and $300 billion in longer-term Treas-
ury securities. When incoming economic data in
mid-2010 suggested that the recovery might be
softening, the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) decided to take further action to fulfill its
mandated objectives of promoting maximum
employment and price stability. First, the Commit-
tee decided at its August 2010 meeting to reinvest
the principal payments from its holdings of agency
debt and agency MBS in longer-term Treasury secu-
rities. Second, it announced in November its inten-
tion to purchase an additional $600 billion of
longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the
second quarter of 2011.
The theory underlying these asset purchases,
which dates back to the early 1950s, posits that
asset prices are affected by the outstanding quan-
tity of assets. In some models, for example, short-
and long-term assets are imperfect substitutes for
one another in investors’ portfolios, and the term
structure of interest rates can be influenced by
changes to the supply of securities at different
maturities. As a result, purchases of longer-term
securities by the central bank can push up the
prices and drive down the yields on those securi-
ties. Asset purchases can also affect longer-term
interest rates by influencing investors’ expectations
of the future path of short-term rates. Similarly, the
effect of central bank asset purchases depends on
expectations regarding the timing and pace of the
eventual unwinding of the purchases. Thus, central
bank communication may play a key role in influ-
encing the response of financial markets to such a
program.
Recent empirical work suggests that the Federal
Reserve’s asset purchase programs have indeed
provided significant monetary accommodation.
Studies of the responses of asset prices to
announcements by the Federal Reserve regarding
its first round of asset purchases have found that
the purchases of Treasury securities, agency debt,
and agency MBS significantly reduced the yields on
those securities.
1 Similarly, analyses of the
responses of asset prices to the purchases them-
selves also documented an effect on the prices of
the acquired securities.
2 Spillover effects of the
purchase programs to other financial markets, in
turn, appear to have resulted in lower interest rates
on corporate debt and residential mortgages and
to have contributed to higher equity valuations and
a somewhat lower foreign exchange value of the
dollar. These effects are qualitatively similar to
those that typically result from conventional mon-
etary policy easing.
Recent research by Federal Reserve staff has pro-
vided some estimates of the magnitude of the
resulting effects on the economy using the FRB/US
macroeconomic model—one of the models devel-
oped by the Federal Reserve Board staff and used
for policy analysis.
3 A simulation exercise suggests
that the cumulative effect of the Federal Reserve’s
asset purchases since 2008—including the original
purchases of Treasury securities, agency debt, and
agency MBS; the reinvestment of principal pay-
ments; and the additional $600 billion in Treasury
security purchases now intended—has been to pro-
vide significant and mounting support to economic
activity over time. Although estimates of these
effects are subject to considerable uncertainty, the
model results suggest that the purchases have
already boosted the level of real gross domestic
product 1¾ percent relative to what it would have
been if no such purchases had occurred, and that
this effect will rise to 3 percent by 2012.
4 As a result
of this stronger recovery in output, the model also
suggests that by 2012 the asset purchase program
will boost private employment about 3 million, and
trim the unemployment rate 1½ percentage points
relative to what they otherwise would be. Finally,
the simulation results suggest that inflation is cur-
rently 1 percentage point higher than otherwise
would have been the case if the FOMC had never
initiated securities purchases, implying that, in the
absence of such purchases, the economy would
now be close to a state of deflation.
Although the asset purchase programs seem to
have provided significant support to economic
activity, some observers have noted that they are
not without risk. One concern that has been voiced
is that these purchase programs have increased the
size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and
could result in monetary accommodation being
left in place for too long, leading to excessive infla-
tion. However, in preparation for removing mon-
etary accommodation, the Federal Reserve has
continued to develop the tools it will need to raise
short-term interest rates and drain large volumes of
reserves when doing so becomes necessary to
achieve the policy stance that best fosters the Fed-
eral Reserve’s macroeconomic objectives.
5 More-
over, the current level of resource slack in the
economy and the recent low readings on underly-
ing inflation suggest that point is not yet near.
A second concern is that the asset purchase pro-
gram could result in adverse financial imbalances if,
for example, the lower level of longer-term interest
rates encouraged potential borrowers to employ
excessive leverage to take advantage of low financ-
ing costs or led investors to accept an imprudently
small amount of compensation for bearing risk in
an effort to enhance their rates of return. The Fed-
eral Reserve is carefully monitoring financial indica-
tors, including credit flows and premiums for credit
risk, for signs of potential threats to financial stabil-
ity. For example, to monitor leverage provided by
dealers to financial market participants, in June
2010 the Federal Reserve launched the Senior
Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer Financing
Terms. This survey provides information on the
terms on and availability of various forms of dealer-
intermediated financing, including funding for
securities positions. Moreover, to better monitor
linkages among firms and markets that could
undermine the stability of the financial system, the
Federal Reserve has increased its emphasis on tak-
ing a multidisciplinary approach that integrates the
contributions of economists, specialists in particu-
lar financial markets, bank supervisors, payments
systems experts, and other professionals. An Office
of Financial Stability Policy and Research was cre-
ated within the Federal Reserve to coordinate staff
efforts to identify and analyze potential risks to the
financial system and broader economy.
1. See, for example, Joseph Gagnon, Matthew Raskin, Julie
Remache, and Brian Sack (2010), “Large-Scale Asset Purchases
by the Federal Reserve: Did They Work?” Federal Reserve Bank
of New York Staff Reports 441 (New York: Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, March); and James Hamilton and Jing (Cynthia)
Wu (2010), “The Effectiveness of Alternative Monetary Policy
Tools in a Zero Lower Bound Environment,” working paper
(San Diego: University of California, San Diego, November).
Evidence of similar effects in the United Kingdom from asset
purchases by the Bank of England was found by Michael
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(2010), “The Financial Market Impact of Quantitative Easing,”
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2. See, for example, Stefania D’Amico and Thomas B. King
(2010), “Flow and Stock Effects of Large-Scale Asset Treasury
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(Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, September).
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and John Williams (2011), “Have We Underestimated the Like-
lihood and Severity of Zero Lower Bound Events?” Federal
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4. These effects are based on certain assumptions regarding
the period assets are held and the unwinding of the pur-
chases. These, and other, assumptions are described in more
detail in Chung and others, “Zero Lower Bound Events,” in box
note 3.
5. The ongoing development of these tools is discussed in
Part 3.
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but remained within their historical ranges. Both
medium- and long-term measures of inflation compen-
sation fell early in the third quarter as investors grew
more concerned about the durability of the economic
recovery, but they then moved back up as the FOMC
was seen as taking additional steps to help move infla-
tion back toward levels more consistent with its man-
date and as economic prospects improved. Rising
energy prices may also have contributed to the
increases in medium-term inflation compensation.
Corporate Debt and Equity Markets
During the second half of 2010 and early 2011, the
spreads between the yields on investment-grade corpo-
rate bonds and those on comparable-maturity Treas-
ury securities narrowed modestly (figure 36). Similar
risk spreads on corporate bonds with below-
investment-grade ratings narrowed more substan-
tially—as much as 200 basis points. This spread com-
pression was consistent with continued improvements
in corporate credit quality as well as increased investor
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 23confidence in the durability of the recovery. Nonethe-
less, bond spreads now stand near the lower end of
their historical ranges. In the secondary market for
syndicated leveraged loans, the average bid price
moved up further, a development that reflected strong
investor demand as well as improved fundamentals
(figure 37). A notable share of loans traded at or above
par in early 2011.
Equity prices have risen sharply since mid-2010 (fig-
ure 38). The rally began amid expectations of further
monetary policy accommodation and was further sup-
ported by robust corporate earnings and an improved
economic outlook. The gains in equity prices were
broad based. Implied volatility for the S&P 500, calcu-
lated from options prices, generally trended down in
the second half of 2010 and early 2011 and reached
fairly low levels, although it increased recently against
a backdrop of rising political turmoil in the Middle
East and North Africa (figure 39).
With some investors apparently seeking to boost
returns in an environment of low interest rates, net
inflows into mutual funds that invest in higher-yielding
fixed-income instruments, including speculative-grade
bonds and leveraged loans, were robust in the second
half of 2010 and early 2011. These inflows likely sup-
ported strong issuance and contributed to the narrow-
ing of bond spreads during this period. Mutual funds
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funds were more modest so that overall inflows to
bond funds in the second half of 2010 were similar to
those in the first half of the year (figure 40). Despite
the strong gains in U.S. equity markets, mutual funds
investing in domestic equities experienced sizable out-
flows for much of the second half of last year, but
these funds attracted net inflows in early 2011. Invest-
ments in money market mutual funds changed little in
the second half of 2010—following notable outflows
earlier in the year—as the assets held by these funds
continued to generate very low yields.
Market Functioning and Dealer-
Intermediated Credit
Conditions in short-term funding markets, which had
experienced notable strains in the spring when inves-
tors became concerned about European sovereign debt
and banking issues, generally improved early in the
second half of 2010. Spreads of London interbank
offered rates, or Libor, over comparable-maturity over-
night index swap rates—a measure of stress in short-
term bank funding markets—reversed the widening
observed in the spring and then remained fairly narrow
despite the reemergence of concerns about the situa-
tion in Europe in the fall (figure 41). Nevertheless,
amid the renewed concerns, tiering was reportedly evi-
dent in dollar funding markets abroad, as institutions
located in peripheral European countries apparently
faced reduced access to funding. Issuance of commer-
cial paper in the United States by institutions head-
quartered in peripheral Europe declined as investors
required notably higher rates to hold this paper.
Besides these strains and some modest, short-lived
year-end pressures, conditions in short-term funding
markets continued to be stable. The spreads between
yields on lower-quality A2/P2-rated paper and
AA-rated asset-backed commercial paper over those
on higher-quality AA-rated nonfinancial paper
remained narrow through the fall and into 2011 (fig-
ure 42). Since last summer, haircuts on securities used










2011 2009 2007 2005 2003 2001 1999 1997 1995
39. Implied S&P 500 volatility, 1995–2011  
NOTE:          The   data   are   weekly   and   extend   through   the   week  ending
        February 25, 2011. The final observation is an estimate based on data through
February  23,  2011.  The  series  shown—the  VIX—is  the  implied  30-day
volatility of the S&P 500 stock price index as calculated from a weighted
average of options prices. 










Billions of dollars, monthly rate
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006




NOTE: The data exclude reinvested dividends and are not seasonally
adjusted. 
SOURCE: Investment Company Institute. 
Money market funds












2011 2010 2009 2008 2007
41. Libor minus overnight index swap rate, 2007–11  
Three-month
Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July Jan.
NOTE: The data are daily and extend through February 22, 2011. An
overnight index swap (OIS) is an interest rate swap with the floating rate tied to
an index of daily overnight rates, such as the effective federal funds rate. At
maturity, two parties exchange, on the basis of the agreed notional amount, the
difference between interest accrued at the fixed rate and interest accrued by
averaging the floating, or index, rate. Libor is the London interbank offered
rate. 
SOURCE: For Libor, British Bankers’ Association; for the OIS rate, Prebon. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 25exhibiting some volatility in the fourth quarter and
early 2011, were generally little changed.
Information from the Federal Reserve’s quarterly
Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer
Financing Terms suggested that the major dealers
eased credit terms to most types of counterparties dur-
ing the second half of 2010, primarily in response to
more-aggressive competition from other institutions
and to an improvement in the current or expected
financial strength of the counterparties. The easing of
terms occurred primarily for securities-financing trans-
actions, while nonprice terms for over-the-counter
derivatives transactions were reportedly little changed
on net. Survey respondents also noted a general
increase in the demand for funding for all types of
securities covered in the survey.
While remaining well below pre-crisis levels, the use
of dealer-intermediated leverage appears to have
gradually increased since the end of the summer, inter-
rupted by a brief retrenchment in early December
when concerns about developments in Europe intensi-
fied. This trend is reflected in the increased funding of
equities by hedge funds and other levered investors and
in an uptick in demand for the funding of some other
types of securities. In addition, recent leveraged
finance deals—involving the new issuance of high-
yield corporate bonds and syndicated leveraged
loans—on average reflected greater levering of the
underlying corporate assets, but they nonetheless gen-
erated strong interest on the part of investors in a very
low interest rate environment. However, there was little
evidence that dealer-intermediated funding of less-
liquid assets increased materially, and new issuance of
structured products that embed leverage and were
originated in large volumes prior to the crisis—includ-
ing, for example, complex mortgage derivatives—has
not resumed on any significant scale. In general, the
appetite for additional leverage on the part of most
market participants—as reflected in responses to spe-
cial questions on the September SCOOS, triparty repo
market volumes, and other indicators—appears to
have remained generally muted, with most investors
not fully utilizing their existing funding capacity.
Measures of liquidity and functioning in most
financial markets pointed to generally stable conditions
since mid-2010. In the Treasury market, various indi-
cators, such as differences in prices of securities with
similar remaining maturities and spreads between
yields on on- and off-the-run issues, suggest that the
market continued to operate normally, including dur-
ing the period when the Federal Reserve was imple-
menting its new asset purchase program. Bid-asked
spreads were generally about in line with historical
averages, and dealer transaction volumes have contin-
ued to reverse the declines observed during the finan-
cial crisis. In the syndicated loan market, bid-asked
spreads trended down further in the second half of
2010 and in early 2011 as the market continued to
recover, although they remained above the levels
observed prior to 2007. Estimates of bid-asked spreads
in corporate bond markets were within historical
ranges, as was the dispersion of dealer quotes in the
credit default swap market.
Banking Institutions
Returns on equity and returns on assets for commer-
cial banks in the second half of 2010 improved moder-
ately from earlier in the year but remained well below
the levels that prevailed before the financial crisis (fig-
ure 43). Profits for the industry as a whole have ben-
efitted considerably in recent quarters from reductions
in loan loss provisioning. However, pre-provision net
revenue decreased over the second half of the year as
net interest margins slid and income from both deposit
fees and trading activities declined.
12 About 70 of the
more than 6,500 commercial banks in the United
States failed between July and December 2010, down
slightly from the 86 failures that occurred in the first
half of the year.
Spreads on credit default swaps written on banking
organizations generally held steady or moved down, on
12. Pre-provision net revenue is the sum of net interest income and
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42. Commercial paper spreads, 2007–11  
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NOTE: The data are weekly and extend through February 23, 2011.
Commercial paper yield spreads are for an overnight maturity and are
expressed relative to the AA nonfinancial rate. 
SOURCE: Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation. 
26 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress □ March 2011net, since mid-2010 (figure 44). Moreover, indicators of
credit quality at commercial banks showed signs of
improvement. Aggregate delinquency and charge-off
rates moved down, although they remain high. Loss
provisioning stayed elevated, but the recent reductions
generally exceeded the declines in charge-offs, which
suggests that banks expect credit quality to improve
further in coming quarters. Indeed, for every major
loan type, significant net fractions of banks reported
on the January Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey
that they expect credit quality to improve during the
current year if economic activity progresses in line with
consensus forecasts.
Equity prices of commercial banks moved higher, on
net, since mid-2010 (figure 45). During this period,
large commercial banks generally reported earnings
that beat analysts’ expectations, and improved eco-
nomic prospects were seen as boosting loan demand
and supporting loan quality going forward, develop-
ments that would buoy banks’ profitability. Neverthe-
less, investors were anxious about the degree to which
future profitability might be negatively affected by a
number of factors, including the quality of assets on
banks’ books, changes in the regulatory landscape,
mortgage documentation and foreclosure issues, and
the potential for some nonperforming mortgages in
securitized pools to be put back to some of the large
banks.
Total assets of commercial banks changed little, on
net, during the second half of 2010, although there
were notable compositional shifts. With demand weak
and lending standards tight, total loans contracted
(figure 46). Nevertheless, the pace at which loans
decreased was not as rapid as in the first half of the
year, in part because banks’ holdings of commercial
and industrial loans picked up and their holdings of
closed-end residential mortgages grew steadily. Partly
offsetting the declines in total loans, banks expanded
their holdings of Treasury securities and agency MBS,
although the growth in their securities holdings slowed
late in the year and into 2011.
Regulatory capital ratios at commercial banks
moved higher, on balance, over the second half of
2010. The upward trend in capital ratios over the past
several years has been most pronounced at the largest
banks as they accumulated capital while risk-weighted
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43. Commercial bank profitability, 1988–2010  
Percent, annual rate
Return on equity
NOTE: The data are quarterly and extend through 2010:Q4. 
SOURCE: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Consolidated
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44. Spreads on credit default swaps for selected  
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NOTE: The data are daily and extend through February 22, 2011. Median
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45. Equity price index for banks, 2009–11  
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NOTE: The data are daily and extend through February 22, 2011. 
SOURCE: Standard & Poor’s. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 27unchanged. Capital requirements for many of these
banks will increase significantly under the new interna-
tional capital standards, which will restrict the defini-
tion of regulatory capital and increase the risk weights
assigned to some assets and off-balance-sheet expo-
sures. In addition, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires that
the Federal Reserve issue rules by January 31, 2012,
that will subject bank holding companies with more
than $50 billion in assets to additional capital and
liquidity requirements.
Monetary Aggregates and the Federal
Reserve’s Balance Sheet
The M2 monetary aggregate has expanded at a moder-
ate pace since mid-2010 after rising only slightly in the
first half of last year (figure 47); for the year as a
whole, M2 grew 3.2 percent, the slowest annual
increase since 1994.
13 As has been the case for some
time, the strongest increase was in liquid deposits, the
largest component of M2, while small time deposits
and retail money market mutual fund assets continued
to contract. Liquid deposits tended to pay slightly
more-favorable interest rates than did their close sub-
stitutes. The currency component of the money stock
expanded at a faster rate in the second half of 2010
than it had earlier in the year. The monetary base—
essentially equal to the sum of currency in circulation
and the reserve balances of depository institutions held
at the Federal Reserve—contracted slightly during the
second half of 2010, although the downward trend
started to reverse late in the period in response to the
Federal Reserve’s new Treasury security purchase
program.
The size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet
remained at a historically high level throughout the
second half of 2010. In early 2011, the balance sheet
stood at about $2.5 trillion, an increase of around
$200 billion from its level in early July (table 1). The
expansion of the balance sheet was more than
accounted for by an increase in holdings of Treasury
securities, which were up nearly $450 billion since the
summer. The additional holdings of Treasury securities
resulted from the FOMC’s August decision to reinvest
the proceeds from paydowns of agency debt and MBS
in longer-term Treasury securities and the asset pur-
chase program announced at the November FOMC
meeting. To provide operational flexibility and to
ensure that it is able to purchase the most attractive
13. M2 consists of (1) currency outside the U.S. Treasury, Federal
Reserve Banks, and the vaults of depository institutions; (2) traveler’s
checks of nonbank issuers; (3) demand deposits at commercial banks
(excluding those amounts held by depository institutions, the U.S.
government, and foreign banks and official institutions) less cash
items in the process of collection and Federal Reserve float; (4) other
checkable deposits (negotiable order of withdrawal, or NOW,
accounts and automatic transfer service accounts at depository insti-
tutions; credit union share draft accounts; and demand deposits at
thrift institutions); (5) savings deposits (including money market
deposit accounts); (6) small-denomination time deposits (time depos-
its issued in amounts of less than $100,000) less individual retirement
account (IRA) and Keogh balances at depository institutions; and
(7) balances in retail money market mutual funds less IRA and
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46. Change in total bank loans, 1990–2010  
NOTE: The data, which are seasonally adjusted, are quarterly and extend
through 2010:Q4. Data have been adjusted for banks’ implementation of
certain accounting rule changes (including the Financial Accounting
Standards Board’s Statements of Financial Accounting Standards Nos. 166
and 167) and for the effects of large nonbank institutions converting to
commercial banks or merging with a commercial bank. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release H.8, “Assets and
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NOTE: For definition of M2, see text note 13. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release H.6, “Money Stock
Measures.” 
28 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress □ March 2011securities on a relative-value basis, the Federal Reserve
temporarily relaxed its 35 percent per-issue limit on
System Open Market Account (SOMA) holdings of
individual Treasury securities and will allow SOMA
holdings to rise above the previous threshold in modest
increments up to a 70 percent per-issue limit; holdings
of particular issues exceed the previous limit for only a
small number of securities. In contrast, holdings of
agency debt and agency MBS declined about $180 bil-
lion between early July and early 2011. The wave of
mortgage refinancing that occurred in the autumn in
the wake of the drop in mortgage rates contributed
notably to the sharp decline in Federal Reserve hold-
ings of MBS. In addition, holdings of agency debt
declined as these securities matured.
Use of regular discount window lending facilities,
such as the primary credit facility, has been minimal
for some time. The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility (TALF) was closed on June 30, 2010. Loans
outstanding under the TALF declined from $42 billion
in mid-2010 to $21 billion in early 2011 as improved
conditions in some securitization markets resulted in
prepayments of loans made under the facility. The
other broad-based credit facilities that the Federal
Reserve had introduced to provide liquidity to finan-
cial institutions and markets during the financial crisis
were closed early in 2010. All loans extended through
these programs had been repaid by the summer.
The portfolio holdings of Maiden Lane LLC,
Maiden Lane II LLC, and Maiden Lane III LLC,
1. Selected components of the Federal Reserve balance sheet, 2009–11
Millions of dollars






Total assets ............................................................................................ 2,237,258 2,335,457 2,537,175
Selected assets
Credit extended to depository institutions and dealers
Primary credit ....................................................................................... 19,111 17 24
Term auction credit .................................................................................. 75,918 0 0
Primary Dealer Credit Facility and other broker-dealer credit ......................................... 0 … …
Central bank liquidity swaps .......................................................................... 10,272 1,245 70
Credit extended to other market participants
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility ...................... 0 … …
Net portfolio holdings of Commercial Paper Funding Facility LLC ................................... 14,072 1 …
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility .......................................................... 47,532 42,278 20,997
Support of critical institutions
Net portfolio holdings of Maiden Lane LLC, Maiden Lane II LLC, and Maiden Lane III LLC
1 ....... 65,024 66,996 64,902
Credit extended to American International Group, Inc. ............................................... 22,033 24,560 …
Preferred interests in AIA Aurora LLC and ALICO Holdings LLC ................................... 25,000 25,733 …
Securities held outright
U.S. Treasury securities .............................................................................. 776,587 776,997 1,213,425
Agency debt securities ............................................................................... 159,879 164,762 144,119
Agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
2 .......................................................... 908,257 1,118,290 958,201
MEMO
Term Securities Lending Facility
3 ...................................................................... 0 … …
Total liabilities ......................................................................................... 2,185,139 2,278,523 2,484,141
Selected liabilities
Federal Reserve notes in circulation .................................................................. 889,678 907,698 956,012
Reverse repurchase agreements ...................................................................... 70,450 62,904 59,484
Deposits held by depository institutions .............................................................. 1,025,271 1,061,239 1,297,905
Of which: Term deposits .......................................................................... … 2,122 5,070
U.S. Treasury, general account ....................................................................... 149,819 16,475 23,123
U.S. Treasury, Supplementary Financing Account .................................................... 5,001 199,963 124,976
Total capital ........................................................................................... 52,119 56,934 53,035
NOTE: LLC is a limited liability company.
1. The Federal Reserve has extended credit to several LLCs in conjunction with efforts to support critical institutions. Maiden Lane LLC was formed to acquire certain
assets of The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Maiden Lane II LLC was formed to purchase residential mortgage-backed securities from the U.S. securities lending reinvest-
ment portfolio of subsidiaries of American International Group, Inc. (AIG). Maiden Lane III LLC was formed to purchase multisector collateralized debt obligations on
which the Financial Products group of AIG has written credit default swap contracts.
2. Includes only MBS purchases that have already settled.
3. The Federal Reserve retains ownership of securities lent through the Term Securities Lending Facility.
... Not applicable.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release H.4.1, “Factors Affecting Reserve Balances of Depository Institutions and Condition Statement of Federal Reserve
Banks.”
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 29which were created to acquire certain assets from
troubled systemically important institutions during the
crisis, have generally changed little, on net, since mid-
2010. Current estimates of the fair values of the port-
folios of the three Maiden Lane LLCs exceed the cor-
responding loan balances outstanding to each limited
liability company from the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York. Consistent with the terms of the Maiden
Lane LLC transaction, on July 15, 2010, this limited
liability company began making distributions to repay
the loan received from the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York. On January 14, 2011, American Interna-
tional Group, Inc., or AIG, repaid the credit extended
by the Federal Reserve under the revolving credit line,
and the Federal Reserve was paid in full for its pre-
ferred interests in the special purpose vehicles AIA
Aurora LLC and ALICO Holdings LLC, thereby
reducing the balances in these accounts to zero.
Stresses in European dollar funding markets in May
led to the reestablishment of liquidity swap lines
between the Federal Reserve and foreign central banks.
Only a small amount of credit has been issued under
the reestablished facilities, which in December were
extended through August 1, 2011.
On the liability side, Federal Reserve notes in circu-
lation increased a bit, from $908 billion to $956 billion.
Reverse repos edged down. Deposits held at the Fed-
eral Reserve by depository institutions rose to about
$1.3 trillion. The Supplementary Financing Account
declined early in 2011 following the announcement by
the Treasury that it was suspending new issuance
under the Supplementary Financing Program and that
it would allow that account to fall to $5 billion as part
of its efforts to maximize flexibility in debt manage-




The foreign exchange value of the dollar declined over
much of the third quarter of 2010 (figure 48). This
decline was spurred in part by some reversal of flight-
to-safety flows—as financial system strains in Europe
temporarily diminished following the July release of
the results of the European Union (EU) stress tests—
and by fears that the recovery in the United States was
slowing. Mounting expectations that the Federal
Reserve might undertake further asset purchases in
response to the weakening economic outlook also
weighed on the dollar. Although the dollar initially
dropped a bit more following the Federal Reserve’s
announcement in early November that it would pur-
chase additional long-term Treasury securities, it sub-
sequently reversed course as data on economic activity
in the United States began to strengthen and as inves-
tors began to scale back their expectations of the ulti-
mate size of the Federal Reserve’s purchase program.
In the first two months of this year, the dollar edged
down again as the outlook for economic activity
abroad appeared to strengthen and the financial situa-
tion in Europe stabilized. On net, the dollar declined
7 percent on a trade-weighted basis against a broad set
of currencies over the second half of last year and into
the first two months of this year.
Foreign benchmark sovereign yields also declined
over much of the third quarter as concerns about the
U.S. recovery and worries that China’s economy might
decelerate more quickly than had been expected led
investors to question the overall strength of global eco-
nomic growth (figure 49). However, foreign yields sub-
sequently rose as confidence in the global recovery
strengthened, leaving foreign benchmark yields 15 to
60 basis points higher on net.
Foreign equity markets rallied following the release
of the EU stress tests in July, and, although those mar-
kets gave back part of these gains in August over
heightened worries about the pace of global economic
growth, they nonetheless ended the third quarter
higher. Over the fourth quarter and into this year, for-
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48. U.S. dollar nominal exchange rate, broad index,  
2006–11  
NOTE: The data, which are in foreign currency units per dollar, are daily.
The last observation for the series is February 22, 2011. The broad index is a
weighted average of the foreign exchange values of the U.S. dollar against
the currencies of a large group of the most important U.S. trading partners.
The index weights, which change over time, are derived from U.S. export
shares and from U.S. and foreign import shares. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release H.10, “Foreign
Exchange Rates.” 
30 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress □ March 2011outlook improved, notwithstanding renewed stresses in
peripheral Europe. On net, headline equity indexes in
the euro area and Japan are up about 10 to 20 percent
from their levels in mid-2010, while indexes in the
major emerging market economies are about 20 per-
cent higher; all those indexes increased, on balance,
even after having declined a bit recently in the face of
uncertainties about the Middle East and North Africa
(figures 50 and 51).
Although some banks in the euro-area periphery
countries, particularly in Spain, seemed to have better
access to capital markets immediately following the
stress test, their costs of funding rose again late in the
year as market concerns about the Irish and Spanish
banking sectors resurfaced. Banks in the euro-area
periphery relied heavily on the weekly and longer-term
funding operations of the European Central Bank
(ECB) over much of this period. The strains neverthe-
less spilled over into increased funding costs in dollars
for some European banks, although the reaction was
less severe than it had been in May. Reportedly, many
European banks had already met their dollar funding
needs through year-end before these strains occurred.
Market participants welcomed the announcement that
the swap lines between the Federal Reserve and the
ECB, the Bank of England, the Swiss National Bank,
the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of Canada would be
extended through August 1.
With the yen at a 15-year high against the dollar in
nominal terms, Japanese authorities intervened in cur-
rency markets on September 15 (figure 52). Japan’s
Ministry of Finance purchased dollars overnight to
weaken the value of the yen, its first intervention
operation since March 2004. The operation caused the
yen to depreciate immediately about 3 percent against
the dollar, but this movement was fairly short lived, as
theyenrosepastitspre-interventionlevelwithinamonth.
During the third quarter, the EMEs saw an increase
in capital inflows, which added to upward pressures on
their currencies and reportedly triggered further inter-
vention in foreign exchange markets by EME authori-
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49. Yields on benchmark government bonds in selected  
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NOTE: The data, which are for 10-year bonds, are daily. The last
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50. Equity indexes in selected advanced foreign economies,  
2008–11  
Canada
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NOTE:    The   data   are  daily.   The   last  observation   for   each   series   is
  February 22, 2011.  
SOURCE: For Canada, Toronto Stock Exchange 300 Composite Index; for
euro area, Dow Jones Euro STOXX Index; for Japan, Tokyo Stock Exchange
(TOPIX); and, for the United Kingdom, London Stock Exchange (FTSE
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51. Aggregate equity indexes for emerging market  
economies, 2008–11  
Emerging Asia
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NOTE:          The   data    are   daily.     The   last   observation   for   each   series
is  February  22,  2011.   The   Latin   American   economies   are   Argentina,
Brazil, Chile,  Colombia, Mexico,  and Peru;  the emerging  Asian economies
are   China,  India,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,   Pakistan,  the   Philippines,  South





SOURCE:    Bloomberg.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 31measures to discourage portfolio capital inflows in an
attempt to ease upward pressures on their currencies
and in their asset markets. Although capital flows to
EMEs appeared to moderate late in the year as long-
term interest rates in the advanced economies rose,
intervention and the imposition of capital control
measures continued.
The Financial Account
Financial flows in 2010 reflected changes in investor
sentiment over the course of the year, driven in part by
concerns over fiscal difficulties in Europe. Foreign pri-
vate investors made large purchases of U.S. Treasury
securities in the first half of the year, but these “flight
to quality” demands eased somewhat in the third quar-
ter with the improvement in conditions in European
markets (figure 53). Indicators for the fourth quarter
are mixed but suggest that foreign private demand for
U.S. Treasury securities picked up again late in the year
as tensions in European markets reemerged. Foreign
demand for other U.S. securities strengthened in the
second half of the year. Net private purchases of both
U.S. agency debt and U.S. equities were strong, and
foreign investors made small net purchases of corpo-
rate debt securities, in contrast to net sales over the
previous several quarters. U.S. residents continued to
purchase sizable amounts of foreign bonds and equi-
ties, including both emerging market and European
securities (figure 54).
Banks located in the United States continued to lend
abroad, on net, in the third quarter, but at a slower
pace than in the first half of the year, as dollar funding
pressures in European interbank markets eased and
banks abroad relied less on U.S. counterparties for
funding. As a result, inflows from increased foreign
private purchases of U.S. securities more than offset
the banking outflows in the third quarter, generating
net private financial inflows for the first time since late
2008 (figure 55).
Inflows from foreign official institutions increased in
the third quarter, with inflows primarily coming from
countries seeking to counteract upward pressure on
their currencies by purchasing U.S. dollars in foreign
currency markets. These countries then used the pro-
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NOTE: The data, which are in foreign currency units per dollar, are daily.
The last observation for each series is February 22, 2011. 
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53. Net foreign purchases of U.S. securities, 2006–10  
Q3
NOTE: Other U.S. securities include corporate equities and bonds, agency
bonds, and municipal bonds. 
SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Official purchases of U.S. Treasury securities
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54. Net U.S. purchases of foreign securities, 2006–10  
Q3
NOTE: Negative numbers indicate a balance of payments outflow
associated with positive U.S. purchases of foreign securities. 
SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
32 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress □ March 2011ties. Available data for the fourth quarter indicate that
foreign official purchases of U.S. Treasury securities
slowed as the dollar stabilized.
Advanced Foreign Economies
Economic growth in the advanced foreign economies
stepped down in the second half of 2010. To a large
extent, this slowdown reflected standard business cycle
dynamics, as support from fiscal stimulus and the
rebound in global trade and inventories diminished
over the course of the year. In Canada, signs of the
maturing recovery were most evident in the domestic
sector, whereas in Japan, exports decelerated as growth
in emerging Asian economies moderated. In Europe,
the recovery was further restrained by a reemergence of
concerns over fiscal sustainability and banking sector
vulnerabilities in some countries. (See box “An Update
on the European Fiscal Crisis and Policy Responses.”)
However, recent indicators of economic activity across
the advanced foreign economies suggest that perfor-
mance improved moderately toward the end of 2010.
In the manufacturing sector, purchasing managers
indexes have resumed rising and point to solid expan-
sion. Moreover, the recovery appears to be gradually
spilling over to the retail and service sectors, with
household demand benefiting from improving labor
market conditions and rising incomes.
Toward year-end, consumer prices in the advanced
foreign economies were boosted by a run-up in food
and energy prices (figure 56). Japanese 12-month head-
line consumer price inflation turned slightly positive
for the first time since early 2009, in part because of a
hike in the tobacco tax, and headline inflation in
Canada and the euro area recently moved above 2 per-
cent. However, inflation in core consumer prices, which
excludes food and energy prices, remained subdued
amid considerable slack in these economies. One
exception was the United Kingdom, where consumer
price inflation—both headline and core—persisted
above 3 percent throughout 2010, driven by prior
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55. U.S. net financial inflows, 2006–10  
Q3
NOTE: U.S. official flows include the foreign currency acquired when
foreign central banks draw on their swap lines with the Federal Reserve. 
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56. Change in consumer prices for major foreign  
economies, 2007–11  
Canada
NOTE: The data are monthly and extend through January 2011; the percent
change is from one year earlier. 
SOURCE: For the euro area, the European Central Bank; for the United
Kingdom, the U.K. Office for National Statistics; for Japan, the Japan
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57. Official or targeted interest rates in selected  
advanced foreign economies, 2007–11  
Canada
NOTE: The data are daily and extend through February 22, 2011. The data
shown are, for Canada, the target for the overnight rate; for the euro area, the
minimum bid rate on main refinancing operations; for Japan, the target for the
call rate; and, for the United Kingdom, the official bank rate. 
SOURCE: The central bank of each area or country shown. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 33Major central banks in the advanced foreign econo-
mies have maintained an accommodative monetary
policy stance (figure 57), although some have taken
steps to remove the degree of accommodation. The
Bank of Canada raised its target for the overnight rate
50 basis points in the third quarter but since then has
held its policy rate at 1 percent. The ECB discontinued
refinancing operations at 6- and 12-month maturities
but extended fixed-rate refinancing at shorter maturi-
ties and kept its main refinancing rate at 1 percent.
The Bank of England maintained its policy rate at
0.5 percent and the size of its Asset Purchase Facility
at £200 billion. The Bank of Japan took additional
steps to ease policy by cutting its target interest rate
An Update on the European Fiscal Crisis and Policy Responses
The European fiscal crisis has remained a source of
concern in global financial markets despite official
responses over the past year. The crisis began early
in 2010 after large upward revisions to the statistics
on Greek government deficits led to an erosion of
market confidence in the ability of Greece to meet
its fiscal obligations. This situation created spill-
overs to other euro-area countries with high debt
or deficit levels. In early May, the European Union
(EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
announced a joint €110 billion financial support
package for Greece; in addition, the EU established
lending facilities of up to €500 billion, and the
European Central Bank (ECB) began purchasing
sovereign securities to ensure the depth and liquid-
ity of euro-area debt markets. In response to signs
of renewed pressures in dollar funding markets, the
Federal Open Market Committee reopened dollar
swapfacilitieswithanumberofforeigncentralbanks.
Financial tensions moderated somewhat over
the summer, in part because of favorable market
reaction to the results of Europe-wide bank stress
tests released in July. Nevertheless, the spreads of
yields on the sovereign bonds of the most vulner-
able euro-area countries over those of German
bonds remained elevated (figure A). In the autumn,
peripheral European sovereign bond spreads, par-
ticularly those of Ireland, widened further. Two
developments contributed to the heightened ten-
sions: (1) the discussion of a proposal for a more
permanent financial stability mechanism for the
euro area starting in 2013, which could eventually
require the restructuring of private holdings of sov-
ereign debt; and (2) increased concerns over the
growing real estate loan losses of Irish banks and
the associated funding difficulties. Afflicted in part
by deposit flight and difficulties raising funds in the
interbank market, Irish banks became increasingly
dependent on funding from the ECB.
With access to market funding increasingly lim-
ited, Ireland agreed on November 28 to a €67.5 bil-
lion financial support package from the EU and the
IMF, with an additional €17.5 billion of Ireland’s
own funds going to stabilize and recapitalize the
country’s banking sector. Ireland agreed to imple-
ment a four-year fiscal consolidation effort equal to
9 percent of gross domestic product, two-thirds of
which will be spending cuts, on top of the austerity
measuresalreadyadoptedintheprevioustwoyears.
Following this announcement, markets appeared
to shift their focus to the possibility that official
assistance would also be required for other euro-
area countries with high fiscal deficits or debts and
vulnerable banking systems. This development led
to a rise in the sovereign bond spreads of Portugal,
Spain, and, to a lesser extent, Italy and Belgium.
The fear that the Irish problems might spread was
exacerbated by concerns that funds available
under existing support mechanisms could be insuf-
ficient if Spain were to need external assistance.
Partly in response to the increase in financial
strains, the ECB temporarily stepped up its pur-
chases of the debt of vulnerable euro-area coun-
tries and announced following its December policy
meeting that it would delay exit from its nonstan-
dard liquidity measures. In addition, European
leaders have increasingly indicated their desire to
expand or broaden the mandate of current support
facilities, and European governments are organiz-















A. Government debt spreads for peripheral  
European economies, 2009–11  
Greece
2011
NOTE: The data are weekly. The last observation for each series is
February 25, 2011. The spreads shown are the yields on 10-year
bonds less the 10-year German bond yield. 
SOURCE: Bloomberg. 
34 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress □ March 2011from 10 basis points to a range of 0 to 10 basis points.
In addition, it extended from three to six months the
term for its fixed-rate funds-supplying operation, and
it established an asset purchase program of ¥5 trillion
to buy a broad range of financial assets, including gov-
ernment securities, commercial paper, corporate bonds,
exchange-tradedfunds,andrealestateinvestmenttrusts.
Emerging Market Economies
After a robust expansion in the first half of 2010, eco-
nomic activity in the EMEs stepped down in the third
quarter before bouncing back to solid growth in the
fourth. On average over the two quarters, real GDP
growth in the EMEs was well above that observed in
the advanced economies. Economic activity in the
EMEs was boosted by domestic demand, supported by
accommodative monetary and fiscal policies. However,
with output appearing to approach capacity for most
countries, authorities in many EMEs have begun to
unwind the stimulus measures, both monetary and
fiscal, put in place during the crisis. The withdrawal of
monetary stimulus has also been driven by a recent
pickup in consumer price inflation, which has
reflected, in part, a rise in commodity prices.
Monetary policy tightening in the EMEs has likely
been tempered by uncertainties about the pace and
durability of the economic recovery in advanced
economies, which remain an important source of
demand for the EMEs. In addition, the exit from
accommodative stances has been complicated by the
return of private capital flows to these economies.
Capital inflows appear to have exerted some upward
pressure on currencies and have raised concerns about
the possibility of an overheating in asset prices. EME
authorities have so far adopted a variety of strategies
to cope with increased capital flows, including inter-
vention in foreign exchange markets to slow the
upward movement of domestic currencies, prudential
measures targeted to specific markets (such as the
property market), and, in several cases, capital controls.
Real GDP growth in China slowed a bit in the first
half of last year, but it moved back up in the second
half along with a pickup in inflation, prompting Chi-
nese authorities to continue to tighten monetary
policy. Since last June, bank reserve requirements
increased a total of 250 basis points for the largest
banks, and the benchmark one-year bank lending rate
has risen 75 basis points. Chinese authorities have also
raised the minimum down payment required for resi-
dential property investment in order to slow rising
property prices. Since the announcement last June by
Chinese authorities that they would allow more
exchange rate flexibility, the renminbi has appreciated
about 4 percent against the dollar. However, on a real
multilateral, trade-weighted basis, which gauges the
renminbi’s value against China’s major trading part-
ners and adjusts for differences in inflation rates, the
renminbi has depreciated slightly.
In emerging Asia excluding China, the pace of eco-
nomic growth softened in the third quarter of last year.
There was a steep decline in Singapore’s real GDP,
which often exhibits wide quarterly swings. Consider-
able weakness in third-quarter economic activity was
also observed in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thai-
land. However, available indicators suggest that fourth-
quarter GDP growth in the region has picked up again.
In Latin America, real GDP in Mexico and Brazil
also decelerated in the third quarter. Mexican output
has yet to recover fully from the financial crisis; total
manufacturing output slowed over the final two quar-
ters of the year, largely reflecting lower U.S. manufac-
turing growth, which has depressed demand for
exports from Mexico. Economic activity in Brazil,
though having slowed from a very brisk pace in the
first half of the year, has remained solid, supported by
continued fiscal stimulus and high commodity prices.
Brazil’s central bank tightened reserve requirements in
December, prompted by concerns about both the pace
of credit creation and the quality of the credit being
extended. In addition, the Brazilian central bank raised
its policy rate 50 basis points in January of this year.
The new Brazilian government has announced some
spending cuts to reduce aggregate demand and infla-
tionary pressures.
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Monetary Policy: Recent Developments
and Outlook
Monetary Policy over the Second Half
of 2010 and Early 2011
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) main-
tained a target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to
¼ percent throughout the second half of 2010 and into
2011 (figure 58). In the statement accompanying each
regularly scheduled FOMC meeting, the Committee
noted that economic conditions, including low rates of
resource utilization, subdued inflation trends, and
stable inflation expectations, were likely to warrant
exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an
extended period. With the unemployment rate elevated
and measures of underlying inflation somewhat low
relative to levels that the Committee judged to be con-
sistent, over the long run, with its dual mandate of
maximum employment and price stability, the FOMC
took steps during the second half of 2010 to provide
additional monetary accommodation in order to pro-
mote a stronger pace of economic recovery and to help
ensure that inflation, over time, returns to levels consis-
tent with its mandate. In August, the FOMC
announced that it would keep constant the Federal
Reserve’s holdings of longer-term securities at their
then-current level by reinvesting principal payments
from agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securi-
ties (MBS) in longer-term Treasury securities. Then, in
November, the FOMC announced that it intended to
purchase an additional $600 billion of longer-term
Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of
2011. The Committee noted that it would regularly
review the pace of its securities purchases and the over-
all size of the asset purchase program in light of
incoming information.
The information reviewed at the August 10 FOMC
meeting indicated that the pace of the economic recov-
ery had slowed in recent months and that inflation
remained subdued. Private employment had increased
slowly in June and July, and industrial production was
little changed in June after a large increase in May.
Consumer spending continued to rise at a modest rate
in June. However, housing activity dropped back, and
nonresidential construction remained weak. In addi-
tion, the trade deficit widened sharply in May. Condi-
tions in financial markets had become somewhat more
supportive of economic growth since the June meeting,
in part reflecting perceptions of diminished risk of
financial dislocations in Europe. Moreover, partici-
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37pants saw some indications that credit conditions for
households and smaller businesses were beginning to
improve, albeit gradually. A further decline in energy
prices and unchanged prices for core goods and ser-
vices led to a fall in headline consumer prices in June.
Against this backdrop, the Committee agreed to
make no change in its target range for the federal funds
rate at the August meeting. The economic expansion
was seen as continuing, and most members believed
that inflation was likely to stabilize in coming quarters
at rates near recent low readings and then gradually
rise toward levels they considered more consistent with
the Committee’s dual mandate. Nonetheless, members
generally judged that the economic outlook had soft-
ened somewhat more than they had anticipated, and
some saw increased downside risks to the outlook for
both economic growth and inflation. The Committee
noted that the decline in mortgage rates since the
spring was generating increased mortgage refinancing
activity, which would accelerate repayments of princi-
pal on MBS held in the System Open Market Account
(SOMA), and that private investors would have to hold
more longer-term securities as the Federal Reserve’s
holdings ran off, making longer-term interest rates
somewhat higher than they would have been otherwise.
The Committee concluded that it would be appropriate
to begin reinvesting principal payments received from
agency debt and MBS held in the SOMA by purchas-
ing longer-term Treasury securities; such an action
would keep constant the face value of securities held in
the SOMA and thus avoid the upward pressure on
longer-term interest rates that might result if those
holdings were allowed to decline.
As of the September 21 FOMC meeting, the data
continued to suggest that the economic expansion was
decelerating and that inflation remained low. Private
businesses increased employment modestly in August,
but the length of the workweek was unchanged and
the unemployment rate remained elevated. The rise in
business outlays for equipment and software seemed to
have moderated following outsized gains in the first
half of the year. Housing activity weakened further,
and nonresidential construction remained depressed.
Industrial production advanced at a solid pace in July
and rose further in August. Consumer spending con-
tinued to increase at a moderate rate in July and
appeared to be moving up again in August. After fall-
ing in the previous three months, headline consumer
prices had risen in July and August as energy prices
retraced some of their earlier declines, and prices for
core goods and services edged up slightly. Credit was
viewed by participants as remaining readily available
for larger corporations with access to capital markets,
and some reports suggested that credit conditions had
begun to improve for smaller firms. Asset prices had
been relatively sensitive to incoming economic data
over the intermeeting period but generally ended the
period little changed on net. Stresses in European
financial markets were seen by participants as broadly
contained but were thought to bear watching going
forward. Although participants did not expect that the
economy would reenter a recession, many expressed
concern that output growth, and the associated prog-
ress in reducing the level of unemployment, could be
slow for some time. Participants noted a number of
factors that were restraining economic growth, includ-
ing low levels of household and business confidence,
heightened risk aversion, and the still-weak financial
conditions of some households and small businesses.
The Committee agreed at the September meeting to
maintain the target range for the federal funds rate of
0 to ¼ percent and to leave unchanged the level of its
combined holdings of Treasury securities, agency debt,
and agency MBS in the SOMA. In addition, members
agreed that the statement to be released following the
meeting should be adjusted to clarify their assessment
that underlying inflation had been running below levels
that the Committee judged to be consistent with its
dual mandate for maximum employment and price
stability. The clarification was intended, in part, to
help anchor inflation expectations and to reinforce the
indication that economic conditions were likely to war-
rant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate
for an extended period. In light of the considerable
uncertainty about the trajectory of the economy, mem-
bers saw merit in accumulating further information
before reaching a decision about providing additional
monetary stimulus. In addition, members wanted to
consider further the most effective framework for cali-
brating and communicating any additional steps to
provide such stimulus. They noted that unless the pace
of economic recovery strengthened or underlying infla-
tion moved up toward levels consistent with the
FOMC’s mandate, the Committee would consider tak-
ing appropriate action soon.
On October 15, the Committee met by videoconfer-
ence to discuss issues associated with its monetary
policy framework, including alternative ways to express
and communicate the Committee’s objectives, possi-
bilities for supplementing the Committee’s communi-
cation about its policy decisions, the merits of making
smaller and more-frequent adjustments in the Federal
Reserve’s intended securities holdings rather than
larger and less-frequent adjustments, and the potential
38 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress □ March 2011costs and benefits of targeting a term interest rate. The
agenda did not encompass consideration of any policy
actions, and none were taken.
The information reviewed at the November 2–3
FOMC meeting continued to indicate that the eco-
nomic recovery was proceeding at a modest rate, with
only a gradual improvement in labor market condi-
tions. Moreover, measures of underlying inflation were
somewhat low relative to levels that the Committee
judged to be consistent, over the longer run, with its
dual mandate. Consumer spending, business invest-
ment in equipment and software, and exports posted
further gains in the third quarter, and nonfarm inven-
tory investment stepped up. However, construction
activity in both the residential and nonresidential sec-
tors remained depressed, and a significant portion of
the rise in domestic demand was again met by imports.
U.S. industrial production slowed noticeably in August
and September, hiring remained modest, and the
unemployment rate stayed elevated. While participants
considered it quite unlikely that the economy would
slide back into recession, they noted that continued
slow growth and high levels of resource slack could
leave the economic expansion vulnerable to negative
shocks. Participants saw financial conditions as having
become more supportive of economic growth over the
course of the intermeeting period; most, though not
all, of the change appeared to reflect investors’
increased anticipation of a further easing of monetary
policy. Headline consumer price inflation had been
subdued in recent months, despite a rise in energy
prices, as core consumer price inflation trended lower.
Though the economic recovery was continuing,
FOMC members considered progress toward meeting
the Committee’s dual mandate of maximum employ-
ment and price stability as having been disappointingly
slow. Moreover, members generally thought that prog-
ress was likely to remain slow. Accordingly, most mem-
bers judged it appropriate to provide additional policy
accommodation. In their discussion of monetary
policy for the period immediately ahead, Committee
members agreed to maintain the target range for the
federal funds rate at 0 to ¼ percent and to continue the
Committee’s existing policy of reinvesting principal
payments from its securities holdings into longer-term
Treasury securities. The Committee also announced its
intention to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-
term Treasury securities at a pace of about $75 billion
per month through the second quarter of 2011. Pur-
chases of additional Treasury securities were expected
to put downward pressure on longer-term interest
rates, boost asset prices, and lead to a modest reduc-
tion in the foreign exchange value of the dollar. These
changes in financial conditions were expected to pro-
mote a somewhat stronger recovery in output and
employment while also helping return inflation, over
time, to levels consistent with the Committee’s
mandate.
The data presented at the December 14 FOMC
meeting indicated that economic activity was increas-
ing at a moderate rate but that the unemployment rate
remained elevated. The pace of consumer spending
picked up in October and November, exports rose rap-
idly in October, and the recovery in business spending
on equipment and software appeared to be continuing.
In contrast, residential and nonresidential construction
activity was still depressed. Manufacturing production
registered a solid gain in October. Nonfarm businesses
continued to add workers in October and November,
and the average workweek moved up. The fiscal pack-
age agreed to by the Administration and the Congress
was generally expected by participants to support the
pace of recovery in 2011. Participants noted that inter-
est rates at intermediate and longer maturities had
risen substantially over the intermeeting period, while
credit spreads were roughly unchanged and equity
prices had risen moderately. Financial pressures in
peripheral Europe had increased, leading to a financial
assistance package for Ireland. Longer-run inflation
expectations were stable, but core inflation continued
to trend lower. Overall, the information received dur-
ing the intermeeting period pointed to some improve-
ment in the near-term outlook, and participants
expected economic growth to pick up somewhat going
forward. A number of factors, however, were seen as
likely to continue restraining the recovery, including
the depressed housing market, employers’ continued
reluctance to add to payrolls, and ongoing efforts by
some households and businesses to reduce leverage.
Moreover, the recovery remained subject to some
downside risks, such as the possibility of a more
extended period of weak activity and lower prices in
the housing sector as well as potential financial and
economic spillovers if the banking and sovereign debt
problems in Europe were to worsen further.
Members noted that, while incoming information
over the intermeeting period had increased their confi-
dence that the economic recovery would be sustained,
progress toward the Committee’s dual objectives of
maximum employment and price stability continued to
be modest, and unemployment and inflation appeared
likely to deviate from the Committee’s objectives for
some time. Accordingly, in their discussion of mon-
etary policy for the period immediately ahead, Com-
mittee members agreed to continue expanding the Fed-
eral Reserve’s holdings of longer-term securities as
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to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate
at 0 to ¼ percent and to reiterate its expectation that
economic conditions were likely to warrant exception-
ally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended
period. While the economic outlook was seen as
improving, members generally felt that the change in
the outlook was not sufficient to warrant any adjust-
ments to the asset purchase program, and some noted
that more time was needed to accumulate information
on the economy before considering any adjustment.
Members emphasized that the pace and overall size of
the purchase program would be contingent on eco-
nomic and financial developments; however, some indi-
cated that they had a fairly high threshold for making
changes to the program.
On December 21, the Federal Reserve announced an
extension through August 1, 2011, of its temporary
U.S. dollar liquidity swap arrangements with the Bank
of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Cen-
tral Bank, the Bank of Japan, and the Swiss National
Bank. The authorization of the swap arrangements
had previously been set to expire on January 31, 2011.
The data reviewed at the January 25–26 FOMC
meeting indicated that the economic recovery was
gaining a firmer footing, though the expansion had not
yet been sufficient to bring about a significant
improvement in labor market conditions. Consumer
spending had risen strongly late in 2010, and the ongo-
ing expansion in business outlays for equipment and
software appeared to have been sustained in recent
months. Industrial production had increased solidly in
November and December. However, construction
activity in both the residential and nonresidential sec-
tors remained weak. Modest gains in employment had
continued, but the unemployment rate remained
elevated. Conditions in financial markets were viewed
by participants as having improved somewhat further
over the intermeeting period, as equity prices had risen
and credit spreads on the debt of nonfinancial corpo-
rations had continued to narrow while yields on
longer-term nominal Treasury securities were little
changed. Credit conditions were still tight for smaller,
bank-dependent firms, although bank loan growth had
picked up in some sectors. Despite further increases in
commodity prices, measures of underlying inflation
remained subdued and longer-run inflation expecta-
tions were stable.
The information received over the intermeeting
period had increased members’ confidence that the
economic recovery would be sustained, and the down-
side risks to both economic growth and inflation were
viewed as having diminished. Nevertheless, members
noted that the pace of the recovery was insufficient to
bring about a significant improvement in labor market
conditions, and that measures of underlying inflation
were trending downward. Moreover, the economic pro-
jections submitted for this meeting indicated that
unemployment was expected to remain above, and
inflation to remain somewhat below, levels consistent
with the Committee’s objectives for some time.
Accordingly, the Committee decided to maintain its
existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from
its securities holdings and reaffirmed its intention to
purchase $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securi-
ties by the end of the second quarter of 2011. Mem-
bers emphasized that the Committee would continue
to regularly review the pace of its securities purchases
and the overall size of the asset purchase program. In
addition, the Committee maintained the target range
of 0 to ¼ percent for the federal funds rate and reiter-
ated its expectation that economic conditions were
likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal
funds rate for an extended period.
Tools for the Withdrawal
of Monetary Policy Accommodation
Although the FOMC continues to anticipate that eco-
nomic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally
low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended
period, ultimately the Federal Reserve will need to
begin to tighten monetary conditions to prevent the
development of inflationary pressures as the economy
recovers. The Federal Reserve has the tools it needs to
remove policy accommodation at the appropriate time.
One tool is the interest rate paid on reserve balances.
By increasing the rate paid on reserves, the Federal
Reserve will be able to put significant upward pressure
on short-term market interest rates because banks will
not supply short-term funds to the money markets at
rates significantly below what they can earn by simply
leaving funds on deposit at the Federal Reserve Banks.
Two other tools, executing term reverse repurchase
agreements (RRPs) with the primary dealers and other
counterparties and issuing term deposits to depository
institutions through the Term Deposit Facility (TDF),
can be used to reduce the large quantity of reserves
held by the banking system; such a reduction would
improve the Federal Reserve’s control of financial con-
ditions by tightening the relationship between the
interest rate paid on reserves and other short-term
interest rates. The Federal Reserve could also reduce
the quantity of reserves in the banking system by
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Federal Reserve without reinvesting the proceeds or by
selling some of its securities holdings.
During the second half of 2010, the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (FRBNY) conducted a series of
small-scale triparty RRP transactions with primary
dealers using all eligible collateral types, including, for
the first time, agency debt and agency MBS from the
SOMA portfolio.
14 The Federal Reserve also con-
ducted a series of small-scale triparty RRP transac-
tions with a set of counterparties that had been
expanded to include approved money market mutual
funds, using Treasury securities, agency debt, and
agency MBS as collateral.
On September 8, the Federal Reserve Board author-
ized a program of regularly scheduled small-value
offerings of term deposits under the TDF.
15 The auc-
tions, which are to occur about every other month, are
intended to ensure the operational readiness of the
TDF and to increase the familiarity of eligible partici-
pants with the auction procedures. Since September,
the Federal Reserve has conducted three auctions, each
of which offered $5 billion in 28-day deposits. All of
these auctions were well subscribed.
Recent Steps to Increase Transparency
Transparency is an essential principle of modern cen-
tral banking because it appropriately contributes to the
accountability of central banks to the government and
the public and because it can enhance the effectiveness
of central banks in achieving macroeconomic objec-
tives. The Federal Reserve provides detailed informa-
tion concerning the conduct of monetary policy.
16
During the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve devel-
oped a public website that contains extensive informa-
tion on its credit and liquidity programs, and, in 2009,
the Federal Reserve began issuing detailed monthly
reports on these programs.
17
Recently, the Federal Reserve has taken further steps
to enhance its transparency and expand the amount of
information it provides to the public. First, on Decem-
ber 1, the Federal Reserve posted detailed information
on its public website about the individual credit and
other transactions conducted to stabilize markets dur-
ing the financial crisis, restore the flow of credit to
American families and businesses, and support eco-
nomic recovery and job creation in the aftermath of
the crisis.
18 As mandated by the Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(Dodd–Frank Act), transaction-level details from
December 1, 2007, to July 21, 2010, were provided
about entities that participated in the agency MBS pur-
chase program, used Federal Reserve liquidity swap
lines, borrowed through the Term Auction Facility, or
received loans or other financial assistance through a
program authorized under section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act. Many of these transactions were con-
ducted through a variety of broad-based lending facili-
ties and provided liquidity to financial institutions and
markets through fully secured, mostly short-term
loans. Other transactions involved purchases of agency
MBS and supported mortgage and housing markets;
these transactions lowered longer-term interest rates
and fostered economic growth. Dollar liquidity swap
lines with foreign central banks posed no financial risk
to the Federal Reserve because the Federal Reserve’s
counterparties were the foreign central banks them-
selves, not the institutions to which the foreign central
banks then lent the funds; these swap facilities helped
stabilize dollar funding markets abroad, thus contrib-
uting to the restoration of stability in U.S. markets.
Other transactions provided liquidity to particular
institutions whose disorderly failure could have
severely stressed an already fragile financial system.
A second step toward enhanced transparency
involves disclosures going forward. The Dodd–Frank
Act established a framework for the disclosure of
information on credit extended after July 21, 2010,
through the discount window under section 10B of the
Federal Reserve Act or from a section 13(3) facility, as
14. In a triparty repurchase agreement, both parties to the agree-
ment must have cash and collateral accounts at the same triparty
agent, which is by definition also a clearing bank. The triparty agent
will ensure that collateral pledged is sufficient and meets eligibility
requirements, and all parties agree to use collateral prices supplied by
the triparty agent.
15. A few TDF auctions had occurred previously, but they were
not part of a regular program.
16. Immediately following each meeting, the FOMC releases a
statement that lays out the rationale for the policy decision. Detailed
minutes of each FOMC meeting are made public three weeks follow-
ing the meeting. Lightly edited transcripts of FOMC meetings are
released to the public with a five-year lag. FOMC statements,
minutes, and transcripts, as well as other related information, are
available on the Federal Reserve Board’s website. See Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Federal Open Market
Committee,” webpage, www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
fomc.htm.
17. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
“Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet,” webpage,
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst.htm; and Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Monthly Report on
Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet,” webpage,
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/clbsreports.htm.
18. These data are available at Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, “Regulatory Reform: Usage of Federal Reserve
Credit and Liquidity Facilities,” webpage, www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/reform_transaction.htm.
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(OMO) transactions. Generally, this framework
requires the Federal Reserve to publicly disclose cer-
tain information about discount window borrowers
and OMO counterparties approximately two years
after the relevant loan or transaction; information
about borrowers under future section 13(3) facilities
will be disclosed one year after the authorization for
the facility is terminated. The information to be dis-
closed includes the name and identifying details of
each borrower or counterparty, the amount borrowed,
the interest rate paid, and information identifying the
types and amounts of collateral pledged or assets
transferred in connection with the borrowing or
transaction.
Finally, the Federal Reserve has also increased trans-
parency with respect to the implementation of mon-
etary policy. In particular, the Federal Reserve took
steps to provide additional information about its secu-
rity purchase operations with the objective of encour-
aging wider participation in such operations. The
FRBNY publishes, on an ongoing basis, schedules of
purchase operations expected to take place over the
next four weeks; details provided include lists of
operation dates, settlement dates, security types to be
purchased, the maturity date range of eligible issues,
and an expected range for the size of each operation.
Results of each purchase operation are published
shortly after it has concluded. In addition, the
FRBNY has commenced publication of information
on the prices paid for individual securities in its pur-
chase operations.
19
19. General information on OMOs, including links to the prices
paid in recent purchases of Treasury securities, is available on the
FRBNY’s website at www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pomo/display/
index.cfm.
42 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress □ March 2011Part 4
Summary of Economic Projections
The following material appeared as an addendum to the
minutes of the January 25–26, 2011, meeting of the
Federal Open Market Committee.
In conjunction with the January 25–26, 2011, Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting, the mem-
bers of the Board of Governors and the presidents of
the Federal Reserve Banks, all of whom participate in
the deliberations of the FOMC, submitted projections
for growth of real output, the unemployment rate, and
inflation for the years 2011 to 2013 and over the longer
run. The projections were based on information avail-
able through the end of the meeting and on each par-
ticipant’s assumptions about factors likely to affect
economic outcomes, including his or her assessment of
appropriate monetary policy. “Appropriate monetary
policy” is defined as the future path of policy that each
participant deems most likely to foster outcomes for
economic activity and inflation that best satisfy his or
her interpretation of the Federal Reserve’s dual objec-
tives of maximum employment and stable prices.
Longer-run projections represent each participant’s
assessment of the rate to which each variable would be
expected to converge over time under appropriate
monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks.
As depicted in figure 1, FOMC participants’ projec-
tions for the next three years indicated that they expect
a sustained recovery in real economic activity, marked
by a step-up in the rate of increase in real gross domes-
tic product (GDP) in 2011 followed by further modest
acceleration in 2012 and 2013. They anticipated that,
over this period, the pace of the recovery would exceed
their estimates of the longer-run sustainable rate of
increase in real GDP by enough to gradually lower the
unemployment rate. However, by the end of 2013, par-
ticipants projected that the unemployment rate would
still exceed their estimates of the longer-run unemploy-
ment rate. Most participants expected that inflation
would likely move up somewhat over the forecast
period but would remain at rates below those they see
as consistent, over the longer run, with the Commit-
tee’s dual mandate of maximum employment and price
stability.
As indicated in table 1, relative to their previous pro-
jections in November 2010, participants anticipated
somewhat more rapid growth in real GDP this year,
but they did not significantly alter their expectations
for the pace of the expansion in 2012 and 2013 or for
the longer run. Participants made only minor changes
to their forecasts for the path of the unemployment






2011 2012 2013 Longer run 2011 2012 2013 Longer run
Change in real GDP ..................... 3.4 to 3.9 3.5 to 4.4 3.7 to 4.6 2.5 to 2.8 3.2 to 4.2 3.4 to 4.5 3.0 to 5.0 2.4 to 3.0
November projection .................. 3.0 to 3.6 3.6 to 4.5 3.5 to 4.6 2.5 to 2.8 2.5 to 4.0 2.6 to 4.7 3.0 to 5.0 2.4 to 3.0
Unemployment rate ..................... 8.8 to 9.0 7.6 to 8.1 6.8 to 7.2 5.0 to 6.0 8.4 to 9.0 7.2 to 8.4 6.0 to 7.9 5.0 to 6.2
November projection .................. 8.9 to 9.1 7.7 to 8.2 6.9 to 7.4 5.0 to 6.0 8.2 to 9.3 7.0 to 8.7 5.9 to 7.9 5.0 to 6.3
PCE inflation ............................ 1.3 to 1.7 1.0 to 1.9 1.2 to 2.0 1.6 to 2.0 1.0 to 2.0 0.7 to 2.2 0.6 to 2.0 1.5 to 2.0
November projection .................. 1.1 to 1.7 1.1 to 1.8 1.2 to 2.0 1.6 to 2.0 0.9 to 2.2 0.6 to 2.2 0.4 to 2.0 1.5 to 2.0
Core PCE inflation
3 ..................... 1.0 to 1.3 1.0 to 1.5 1.2 to 2.0 0.7 to 1.8 0.6 to 2.0 0.6 to 2.0
November projection .................. 0.9 to 1.6 1.0 to 1.6 1.1 to 2.0 0.7 to 2.0 0.6 to 2.0 0.5 to 2.0
NOTE: Projections of change in real gross domestic product (GDP) and in inflation are from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the year
indicated. PCE inflation and core PCE inflation are the percentage rates of change in, respectively, the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and the
price index for PCE excluding food and energy. Projections for the unemployment rate are for the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year indi-
cated. Each participant’s projections are based on his or her assessment of appropriate monetary policy. Longer-run projections represent each participant’s assessment of
the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy. The November pro-
jections were made in conjunction with the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on November 2–3, 2010.
1. The central tendency excludes the three highest and three lowest projections for each variable in each year.
2. The range for a variable in a given year consists of all participants’ projections, from lowest to highest, for that variable in that year.





































































Figure 1. Central tendencies and ranges of economic projections, 2011–13 and over the longer run  
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NOTE: Definitions of variables are in the notes to table 1. The data for the actual values of the variables are annual. The data for the change in real
GDP, PCE inflation, and core PCE inflation shown for 2010 incorporate the advance estimate of GDP for the fourth quarter of 2010, which the Bureau
of Economic Analysis released on January 28, 2011. This information was not available to FOMC meeting participants at the time of their meeting. 
44 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress □ March 2011rate and for the rate of inflation over the next three
years. Although most participants anticipated that the
economy would likely converge to sustainable rates of
increase in real GDP and prices over five or six years, a
number of participants indicated that they expected
that the convergence of the unemployment rate to its
longer-run level would require additional time.
As they did in November, participants judged the
level of uncertainty associated with their projections
for real economic activity and inflation as unusually
high relative to historical norms. Most continued to see
the risks surrounding their forecasts of GDP growth,
the unemployment rate, and inflation over the next
three years to be generally balanced. However, fewer
noted downside risks to the likely pace of the expan-
sion and, accordingly, upside risks to the unemploy-
ment rate than in November; fewer also saw downside
risks to inflation.
The Outlook
The central tendency of participants’ forecasts for the
change in real GDP in 2011 was 3.4 to 3.9 percent,
somewhat higher than in the November projections.
Participants stated that the economic information
received since November indicated that consumer
spending, business investment, and net exports
increased more strongly at the end of 2010 than
expected earlier; industrial production also expanded
more rapidly than they previously anticipated. In addi-
tion, after the November projections were prepared,
the Congress approved fiscal stimulus measures that
were expected to provide further impetus to household
and business spending in 2011. Moreover, participants
noted that financial conditions had improved since
November, including a rise in equity prices, a pickup in
activity in capital markets, reports of easing of credit
conditions in some markets, and an upturn in bank
lending in some sectors. Many participants viewed the
stronger tenor of the recent information, along with
the additional fiscal stimulus, as suggesting that the
recovery had gained some strength—a development
seen as likely to carry into 2011—and that the expan-
sion was on firmer footing. Participants expected that
the expansion in real economic activity this year would
continue to be supported by accommodative monetary
policy and by ongoing improvement in credit and
financial market conditions. The strengthening in pri-
vate demand was anticipated to be led by increases in
consumer and business spending; over time, improve-
ments in household and business confidence and in
labor market conditions would likely reinforce the rise
in domestic demand. Nonetheless, participants recog-
nized that the information available since November
also indicated that the expansion remained uneven
across sectors of the economy, and they expected that
the pace of economic activity would continue to be
moderated by the weakness in residential and nonresi-
dential construction, the still relatively tight credit con-
ditions in some sectors, an ongoing desire by house-
holds to repair their balance sheets, business caution
about hiring, and the budget difficulties faced by state
and local governments.
Participants expected that the economic expansion
would strengthen further in 2012 and 2013, with the
central tendencies of their projections for the growth in
real GDP moving up to 3.5 to 4.4 percent in 2012 and
then to 3.7 to 4.6 percent in 2013. Participants cited, as
among the likely contributors to a sustained pickup in
the pace of the expansion, a continued improvement in
financial market conditions, further expansion of
credit availability to households and businesses,
increasing household and business confidence, and a
favorable outlook for U.S. exports. Several participants
noted that, in such an environment, and with labor
market conditions anticipated to improve gradually,
the restraints on household spending from past
declines in wealth and the desire to rebuild savings
should abate. A number of participants saw such con-
ditions fostering a broader and stronger recovery in
business investment, with a few noting that the market
for commercial real estate had recently shown signs of
stabilizing. Nonetheless, participants saw a number of
factors that would likely continue to moderate the pace
of the expansion. Most participants expected that the
recovery in the housing market would remain slow,
restrained by the overhang of vacant properties, pros-
pects for weak house prices, and the difficulties in
resolving foreclosures. In addition, some participants
expected that the fiscal strains on the budgets of state
and local governments would damp their spending for
a time and that the federal government sector would
likely be a drag on economic activity after 2011.
Participants anticipated that a gradual but steady
reduction in the unemployment rate would accompany
the pickup in the pace of the economic expansion over
the next three years. The central tendency of their fore-
casts for the unemployment rate at the end of 2011 was
8.8 to 9.0 percent—a decline of less than 1 percentage
point from the actual rate in the fourth quarter of
2010. Although participants generally expected further
declines in the unemployment rate over the subsequent
two years—to a central tendency of 6.8 to 7.2 percent
at the end of 2013—they anticipated that, at the end of
that period, unemployment would remain noticeably
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 45higher than their estimates of the longer-run rate.
Many participants thought that, with appropriate
monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks,
the unemployment rate would continue to converge
gradually toward its longer-run rate within five to six
years, but a number of participants indicated that the
convergence process would likely be more extended.
While participants viewed the projected pace of the
expansion in economic activity as the principal factor
underlying their forecasts for the path of the unem-
ployment rate, they also indicated that their projections
were influenced by a number of other factors that were
likely to contribute to a relatively gradual recovery in
the labor market. In that regard, several participants
noted that dislocations associated with the uneven
recovery across sectors of the economy might retard the
matching of workers and jobs. In addition, a number
of participants viewed the modest pace of hiring in
2010 as, in part, the result of business caution about
the durability of the recovery and of employers’ efforts
to achieve additional increases in productivity; several
participants also cited the particularly slow recovery in
demand experienced by small businesses as a factor
restraining new job creation. With demand expected to
strengthen across a range of businesses and with busi-
ness confidence expected to improve, participants antic-
ipatedthathiringwouldpickupovertheforecastperiod.
Participants continued to expect that inflation would
be relatively subdued over the next three years and
kept their longer-run projections of inflation
unchanged. Many participants indicated that the per-
sistence of large margins of slack in resource utiliza-
tion should contribute to relatively low rates of infla-
tion over the forecast horizon. In addition, participants
noted that appropriate monetary policy, combined
with stable longer-run inflation expectations, should
help keep inflation in check. The central tendency of
their projections for overall personal consumption
expenditures (PCE) inflation in 2011 was 1.3 to
1.7 percent, while the central tendency of their fore-
casts for core PCE inflation was lower—1.0 to 1.3 per-
cent. Increases in the prices of energy and other com-
modities, which were very rapid in 2010, were
anticipated to continue to push headline PCE inflation
above the core rate this year. The central tendency of
participants’ forecasts for inflation in 2012 and 2013
widened somewhat relative to 2011 and showed that
inflation was expected to drift up modestly. In 2013,
the central tendency of forecasts for both the total and
core inflation rates was 1.2 to 2.0 percent. For most
participants, inflation in 2013 was not expected to have
converged to the longer-run rate of inflation that they
individually considered most consistent with the Fed-
eral Reserve’s dual mandate for maximum employment
and stable prices. However, a number of participants
anticipatedthatinflationwouldreachitslonger-runrate
within the next three years.
Uncertainty and Risks
Most participants continued to share the view that
their projections for economic activity and inflation
were subject to a higher level of uncertainty than was
the norm during the previous 20 years.
20 They identi-
fied a number of uncertainties that compounded the
inherent difficulties in forecasting output growth,
unemployment, and inflation. Among them were
uncertainties about the nature of economic recoveries
from recessions associated with financial crises, the
effects of unconventional monetary policies, the persis-
tence of structural dislocations in the labor market, the
future course of federal fiscal policy, and the global
economic outlook.
Almost all participants viewed the risks to their fore-
casts for the strength of the recovery in real GDP as
broadly balanced. By contrast, in November, the distri-
bution of views had been somewhat skewed to the
downside. In weighing the risks to the projected growth
rate of real economic activity, some participants noted
the upside risk that the recent strengthening of aggre-
20. Table 2 provides estimates of forecast uncertainty for the
change in real GDP, the unemployment rate, and total consumer
price inflation over the period from 1990 to 2009. At the end of this
summary, the box “Forecast Uncertainty” discusses the sources and
interpretation of uncertainty in the economic forecasts and explains
the approach used to assess the uncertainty and risks attending the
participants’ projections.
Table 2. Average historical projection error ranges
Percentage points
Variable 2011 2012 2013
Change in real GDP
1 ......................... ±1.3 ±1.7 ±1.8
Unemployment rate
1 ......................... ±0.7 ±1.3 ±1.5
Total consumer prices
2 ....................... ±1.0 ±1.0 ±1.1
NOTE: Error ranges shown are measured as plus or minus the root mean
squared error of projections for 1990 through 2009 that were released in the win-
ter by various private and government forecasters. As described in the box “Fore-
cast Uncertainty,” under certain assumptions, there is about a 70 percent probabil-
ity that actual outcomes for real GDP, unemployment, and consumer prices will
be in ranges implied by the average size of projection errors made in the past. Fur-
ther information is in David Reifschneider and Peter Tulip (2007), “Gauging the
Uncertainty of the Economic Outlook from Historical Forecasting Errors,”
Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2007-60 (Washington: Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, November).
1. For definitions, refer to general note in table 1.
2. Measure is the overall consumer price index, the price measure that has been
most widely used in government and private economic forecasts. Projection is per-
cent change, fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the year
indicated.
46 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress □ March 2011gate spending might mark the beginning of a more
normal cyclical rebound in economic activity in which
consumer spending might be spurred by pent-up
demand for household durables and in which business
investment might be accelerated by the desire to
rebuild stocks of fixed capital. A more-rapid-than-
expected easing of credit availability was also seen as a
factor that might boost the pickup in private demand.
As to the downside risks, many participants pointed to
the recent declines in house prices and the potential for
a slower resolution of existing problems in mortgage
and real estate markets as factors that could have
more-adverse-than-expected consequences for house-
hold spending and bank balance sheets. In addition,
several participants expressed concerns that, in an envi-
ronment of only gradual improvement in labor market
and credit conditions, households might be unusually
focused on reducing debt and boosting saving. A num-
ber of participants also saw a downside risk in the pos-
sibility that the fiscal problems of some state and local
governments might lead to a greater retrenchment in
their spending than currently anticipated. Finally, sev-
eral participants expressed concerns that the financial
and fiscal strains in the euro area might spill over to
U.S. financial markets.
The risks surrounding participants’ forecasts of the
unemployment rate were also broadly balanced and
generally reflected the risks attending participants’
views of the likely strength of the expansion in real
activity. However, a number of participants noted that
the unemployment rate might decline less than they
projected if businesses were to remain hesitant to
expand their workforces because of uncertainty about
the durability of the expansion or about employment
costs or if mismatches of workers and jobs were more
persistent than anticipated.
Most participants judged the risks to their inflation
outlook over the period from 2011 to 2013 to be
broadly balanced as well. Compared with their views in
November, several participants no longer saw the risks
as tilted to the downside, and an additional participant
viewed the risks as weighted to the upside. In assessing
the risks, a number of participants indicated that they
saw the risks of deflation or further unwanted disinfla-
tion to have diminished. Many participants identified
the persistent gap between their projected unemploy-
ment rate and its longer-run rate as a risk that inflation
could be lower than they projected. A few of those
who indicated that inflation risks were skewed to the
upside expressed concerns that the expansion of the
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, if left in place for too
long, might erode the stability of longer-run inflation
expectations. Alternatively, several participants noted
that upside risks to inflation could arise from persis-
tently rapid increases in the costs of energy and other
commodities.
Diversity of Views
Figures 2.A and 2.B detail the diversity of partici-
pants’ views regarding the likely outcomes for real
GDP growth and the unemployment rate in 2011,
2012, 2013, and over the longer run. The dispersion in
these projections reflected differences in participants’
assessments of many factors, including the likely evolu-
tion of conditions in credit and financial markets, the
timing and the degree to which various sectors of the
economy and the labor market will recover from the
dislocations associated with the deep recession, the
outlook for economic and financial developments
abroad, and appropriate future monetary policy and
its effects on economic activity. For 2011 and 2012, the
dispersions of participants’ forecasts for the strength in
the expansion of real GDP and for the unemployment
rate were somewhat narrower than they were last
November, while the ranges of views for 2013 and for
the longer run were little changed.
Figures 2.C and 2.D provide the corresponding
information about the diversity of participants’ views
regarding the outlook for total and core PCE inflation.
These distributions were somewhat more tightly con-
centrated for 2011, but for 2012 and 2013, they were
much the same as they were in November. In general,
the dispersion in the participants’ inflation forecasts
for the next three years represented differences in judg-
ments regarding the fundamental determinants of
inflation, including estimates of the degree of resource
slack and the extent to which such slack influences
inflation outcomes and expectations as well as esti-
mates of how the stance of monetary policy may influ-
ence inflation expectations. Although the distributions
of participants’ inflation forecasts for 2011 through
2013 continued to be relatively wide, the distribution of
projections of the longer-run rate of overall inflation
remained tightly concentrated. The narrow range illus-
trates the broad similarity in participants’ assessments
of the approximate level of inflation that is consistent
with the Federal Reserve’s dual objectives of maximum
employment and price stability.



























































































































































NOTE: Definitions of variables are in the general note to table 1. 
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NOTE: Definitions of variables are in the general note to table 1. 

















































































NOTE: Definitions of variables are in the general note to table 1. 
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The economic projections provided by the mem-
bers of the Board of Governors and the presidents
of the Federal Reserve Banks inform discussions of
monetary policy among policymakers and can aid
public understanding of the basis for policy
actions. Considerable uncertainty attends these
projections, however. The economic and statistical
models and relationships used to help produce
economic forecasts are necessarily imperfect
descriptions of the real world. And the future path
of the economy can be affected by myriad unfore-
seen developments and events. Thus, in setting the
stance of monetary policy, participants consider
not only what appears to be the most likely eco-
nomic outcome as embodied in their projections,
but also the range of alternative possibilities, the
likelihood of their occurring, and the potential
costs to the economy should they occur.
Table 2 summarizes the average historical accu-
racy of a range of forecasts, including those
reported in past Monetary Policy Reports and those
prepared by Federal Reserve Board staff in advance
of meetings of the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee. The projection error ranges shown in the table
illustrate the considerable uncertainty associated
with economic forecasts. For example, suppose a
participant projects that real gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) and total consumer prices will rise
steadily at annual rates of, respectively, 3 percent
and 2 percent. If the uncertainty attending those
projections is similar to that experienced in the
past and the risks around the projections are
broadly balanced, the numbers reported in table 2
would imply a probability of about 70 percent that
actual GDP would expand within a range of 1.7 to
4.3 percent in the current year, 1.3 to 4.7 percent in
the second year, and 1.2 to 4.8 percent in the third
year. The corresponding 70 percent confidence
intervals for overall inflation would be 1.0 to
3.0 percent in the current and second years, and
0.9 to 3.1 percent in the third year.
Because current conditions may differ from those
that prevailed, on average, over history, partici-
pants provide judgments as to whether the uncer-
tainty attached to their projections of each variable
is greater than, smaller than, or broadly similar to
typical levels of forecast uncertainty in the past as
shown in table 2. Participants also provide judg-
ments as to whether the risks to their projections
are weighted to the upside, are weighted to the
downside, or are broadly balanced. That is, partici-
pants judge whether each variable is more likely to
be above or below their projections of the most
likely outcome. These judgments about the uncer-
tainty and the risks attending each participant’s pro-
jectionsaredistinctfromthediversityofparticipants’
views about the most likely outcomes. Forecast
uncertainty is concerned with the risks associated
with a particular projection rather than with diver-
gences across a number of different projections.
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ABS asset-backed securities
AIG American International Group, Inc.
ARRA American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
C&I commercial and industrial
CMBS commercial mortgage-backed securities
CRE commercial real estate
Credit Card
Act Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act
DPI disposable personal income
ECB European Central Bank
ECI employment cost index
EME emerging market economy
EU European Union
FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board
FOMC Federal Open Market Committee; also, the Committee
FRBNY Federal Reserve Bank of New York
GDP gross domestic product
GSE government-sponsored enterprise
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRA individual retirement account
IT information technology
Libor London interbank offered rate
LLC limited liability company
MBS mortgage-backed securities
NFIB National Federation of Independent Business
NIPA national income and product accounts
NOW negotiable order of withdrawal
OMO open market operation
PCE personal consumption expenditures
repo repurchase agreement
RRP reverse repurchase agreement
SCOOS Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer Financing Terms
SLOOS Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices
SOMA System Open Market Account
TALF Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
TARP Troubled Asset Relief Program
TDF Term Deposit Facility
WTI West Texas Intermediate
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